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O. Introduction 
Besides the iterative concept of set, founded by Cantor and formalized by 
Zermelo, there is the Fregean concept of property, which has the following 
characteristic: for any formula • • • x having x as its sole free variable, there is 
a property {x [ • • • x } such that for every M the formulas 
. . .M  m (1) 
and 
{x [ . . .x  } (2) 
are interdeducible. (M e N should strictly speaking be read "M has the property 
N", though we'll sometimes say "M is an element of N".)  
If we take - • - x to the Russell condition x ~ x and set R - {x [ x q x} we get 
that R e R is interdeducible with R g R. From this it follows that R e R cannot be 
either true or false. This is not a contradiction unless we assume that R e R is a 
proposition subject to the laws of classical logic. There are two ways of not 
assuming this, which are only verbally distinct: we can say that R e R is a 
proposition to which the laws of classical ogic do not apply, or we can deny that 
it is a proposition at all. We shall follow the latter course; more precisely We shall 
define a proposition to be anything which is either true or false. 
We are concerned in this paper to see whether the Fregean concept of property 
can serve as a foundation on which (a substantial body of) mathematics can be 
built, in lieu of the iterative concept of set. This is no new venture; the problem 
has a long and complex history. From our point of view, we can begin this history 
with Fitch's 'extended basic logic' ([7], and papers therein cited); in this system a 
fair amount of analysis is built up on the basis of 'Ferge's principle', by which we 
mean the interdedueibility of (1) and (2). But there is a serious problem here; 
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although the real numbers definable (as Dedekind cuts) in Fitch's system are 
intriguingly similar to the classical reals, we have no means of saying much about 
them except by resorting to the metalanguage. Let us suppose that we want to say 
that for every real number x, x is (extensionally) equal to x + 0. We would be 
inclined to write this as 
(Vx)(x =x x +0) (3) 
where • is the set (property) of reals and ---- is extensional equality. Now what 
does this D mean? Fitch takes A ~ B to mean -A  v B, material implication. Thus 
(3) reduces to 
(Vx)(x CRv x .x +0) 
and for this to be true, every object M must satisfy 
M~RvM~-M+O.  
But the set (property) R is not definite, i.e. there are M's for which M e • is 
neither true nor false; and for at least some of these M's, M ~-M + 0 is neither 
true nor false too. 1 Consequently we cannot assert (3). The best we can do is to 
say (in the metalanguage): 
For any closed term t, if t e R is true (provable), so is t + 0 ~- t. 
(In extended basic logic, truth and provability are the same thing.) 
As we said above, a substantial amount of analysis can be developed in 
extended basic logic if we are prepared to adopt this baroque way of talking. If 
we want to say "for every function f defined on an open interval (a, b), so and so 
happens" we have to say something like: 
If a, b and f are terms such that a e R and b ~ R are provable, and such that 
(whenever c and d are terms such that a < c < b and c -  d are provable, then 
f(c) e R and f (c)  ~ f(d) are provable) then . . .  
Even more contorted forms of speech are involved when we want to assert 
things like the Heine-Borel  theorem, K6nig's infinity lemma, Peano's theorem 
on differential equations and so on. Yet all these things are true in extended basic 
logic (which is consequently closer to classical mathematics than to e.g. 
Bishop-style constructive mathematics): the problem is that we don't know how 
to say them (in the language itself). 
What is needed is some kind of implication. The material kind -aA v B will not 
work because it won't allow us to quantify over reals (nor, by a similar argument, 
over real functions); this is because the set R of (Dedekind) reals is not definite. 
(By contrast, the set of Cauchy reals/s definite; we shall examine this alternative 
later.) There is a well-known paradox called the Curry paradox which at first sight 
appears to preclude the possibility of any usable implication. Specifically, suppose 
that ~ satisfies the deduction theorem (if a I- b then I-a ~ b) and modus poens (if 
1 {x e Q [ x < 0 and R e R } is such an M. 
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~a and Fa D b then Fb); and suppose Frege's principle. Then every formula is 
provable. For let i be any formula, and let C-{x lx  e x D i} .  Then C • 
C ~ C • C ~ i (Frege's principle) so C • C F i (modus ponens) so ~C • C D i 
(deduction theorem) so FC • C (Frege's principle) so ~ i  (modus ponens). The 
need for some kind of implication to express propositions of analysis led Fitch to 
a whole slew of systems (cf. e.g. [8]) in all of which Frege's principle holds, and in 
all of which, consequently, either modus ponens or the deduction theorem fails. 
This defect makes them counterintuitive and very hard to use, so that despite the 
heroic amount of work he put into them, they attracted little interest. 
The next chapter in this history is a short paper by one of us [13], which puts 
forward the following idea: Let there be a sequence of implications D0, D1, 
DE , . . .  with the property that A D oB is to be true iff B is deducible from A 
without using any kind of implication, A D 1 B is to be true iff B is deducible from 
A without using properties of any kind of implication except possibly Do, and so 
on; further A Dn B is to be false iff A is true and B false (no matter what n is). It 
is then easily seen to be impossible to carry out the argument of the Curry 
paradox: if we define C,, = {x I x •x  D. Z} all we can deduce is C~ • (7, Dn+ 1 ± 
which does not give C,, • Cn. This idea of 'levels of implication' was formalized in 
[13], but we had at that time no idea of how to give a consistency proof. 
On another front, Aczel [2] was putting forth a system essentially equivalent to 
Fitch's extended basic logic but with an intuitionistic rather than a classical 
predicate calculus. (The possibility of using a classical predicate calculus was 
mentioned but not developed at that time.) The system was described semanti- 
cally (with special reference to Frege himself) and independently of Fitch's work. 
There is no implication except a kind of intuitionistic implication; truth of A D B 
requires that A be a proposition in a still narrower sense than ours, so that we still 
can't assert (Vx)(x • R D x + 0 ~ x) because M • ~ is not a proposition for certain 
M's. 
It would seem that the natural development of analysis in Aczel's system is via 
the Cauchy reals. Specifically, in [2] Aczel embeds Martin-Lrf's intuitionistic 
type theory in his Frege-style system, with a view to showing its adequacy for 
analysis. Now Martin-Lrf 's system gives rise to a Bishop-style analysis based on 
Cauchy sequences. This is much further from classical analysis than is Fitch's 
system with Dedekind reals: in particular the only real functions that can be 
proved to exist are continuous ones and none of the Krnig, Heine-Borel or 
Peano theorems can be proved. None the less, via the embedding, everything in 
Bishop's book except the measure theory can be carried out in Aczel's 
intuitionistic system. 
In a privately circulated note [3], Aczel formalized (i.e. gave a formal system, 
not a model, for) classical Frege structures, i.e. with classical ogic. With some 
minor differences (notably the presence of a form of extensionality (Vx)(fx = 
gx) Df  =g, where D is material implication) this system coincides with Fitch's 
extended basic logic. Now we have for the Cauchy reals a system stronger than 
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Martin-L6f's and consequently an analysis stronger than Bishop's. R c (Cauchy 
reals) and ~d are definite, and if A and B are definite so are A x B and A ~ B; 
thus we have a nice set of types in which we can do analysis with classical ogic. 
Further, the (extensional) equality relation on each of these types is definite. 
However, none of the three named theorems is provable in the formal system [2]; 
this is because Church's thesis (that all functions f:N---~N, consequently all 
Cauchy reals and functions of Cauchy reals are recursive) is consistent with it, 
and because it implies the falsity of the three named theorems. What we get 
resembles recursive analysis (Aberth [1]). 
It emerged from all these developments hat if we want to found something like 
classical mathematics on Frege's conception of a property, the most reasonable 
procedure is to define reals as Dedekind cuts rather then Cauchy sequences, and 
then (in order to quantify over these Dedekind reals) to use the hierarchy of 
implications ~0, ~1,  ~2,  . . . .  The purpose of this paper is (1) to present some of 
the proof-theory and model-theory of classical Frege structures, (2) to formalize 
the hierarchy of implications and prove the consistency of the formalism, and 
finally, (3) to glance briefly at analysis, first using Cauchy reals and then 
Dedekind ones. 
In various minor respects our formalism will be different from Aczel's; the~e 
differences will be pointed out as they occur. 
Summa~ a, of approaches 
I Classical Frege Structures (Aczel): essentially = Fitch's Extended Basic Logic 
ta Cauchy Reals: essentially = Recursive Analysis 
Ib Dedekind Reals: Analysis in the Metalanguage (essentially = Fitch's 
'Demonstrably Consistent Mathematics') 
Ic Dedekind Reals + Hierarchy of Implications (the approach of this 
paper). Analysis in the Object Language 
II Intuitionistic Frege Structures (Aczel) 
IIa Cauchy Reals: essentially = Martin-L6f or Bishop-style Analysis 
IIb Dedekind Reals in Intuitionistic Frege Structures eem not to have 
been investigated 
1. Combinatory logic 
We have said above that the essential feature of the Fregean notion of property 
is that for every formula - - -x  having x as its sole free variable, there is a 
property {x I " " "x } such that for every object M the formulas 
• .. M (5) 
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and 
M e {x I ' "x  } (6) 
are interdeducible. In fact we shall regard (5) and (6) as names of the same object, 
which will be in non-paradoxical cases a proposition (if {x [ . - -x  ) is a 
property, see below). For example, if . - -x  is x =x,  both . . -M  and 
M e {x l . . -x  } will be the proposition that M is identical with itself. (For 
Frege, however, sentences are names of truth-values rather than of propositions; 
this is perhaps Aczel's most important departure from Frege, and it is apparently 
essential for the consistency of his system.) In paradoxical cases, e.g. when 
• - -x  is x ~x  and M is {x[x ~x}, (5) and (6) are still names of the same 
object but that object is not a proposition, i.e., it is neither true nor false. 
We shall use (2x) ( - - -x  ) as an alternative, and in fact as our official, 
notation for {x [ • • • x } henceforth; further we shall regard (6) as an unofficial 
notation for ({x [ - . -  x }M) or ((Zx)( . - -  x 
more general form can be written 
((Lr)(- • .x )M)=- - .M 
)M). Thus Frege's principle in a 
(7) 
(Zx)( - . .  x ) is thus a function whose value for the argument M is the object 
• • • M , which may be a proposition, a number, a function or in fact anything 
whatsoever. (Notice that functional application is denoted by (fx) rather then 
f(x).) In the particular case when - - -M is a proposition, (Zx)( . - -  x ) is 
called a propositional function or (by abuse of language) a set; only in this case 
will we use the alternative notations {x 1-. • x } and M e {x I "" • x }. (Our 
terminology differs here inessentially from Aczel's; he calls {x I - - -x  } a 
propositional function only when • • • M is a proposition for every M; thus if M 
is an empty set M ~ M is a (true) proposition but in the expression M e {x [ x 
x}, which is another name for the same proposition, he would not call {x [ x ~ x} 
a proposit ional function. We shall use the expression 'propositional function' to 
mean a function which sometimes takes a proposition as value, where (as stated 
above) a proposition means anything which is true or false.) 
The theory based on (2) is called the lambda calculus; various formulations of 
it differ by the principles of extensionality included. Aczel's form is 
If • • • ~ and ***~- - ,  are the same 'function' (used here in Frege's sense of 
' incomplete object'),  i.e., if • • • M = ***M for every object M, then 
(xx) ( . . .  x ) = (Zx)(***xm).  (8) 
Henceforth we shall not find it necessary to speak of ' incomplete objects', 
which we consider a dubious feature of Frege's ontology. So we can say simply: If 
• • • M = ***M for every object M, then 
( zO( - - .  x ) = (Zx(***x ). (8') 
With this understanding, we shall henceforth use the word 'function' for things 
of the form (~x)(. • • x -z ; )  which Frege would call the Wertverlauf (and Aezel the 
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course of values) of the 'function' - . .  ~ One further simplification, which 
avoids some technical complexities, is to assume that everything is a function (a 
simplication analogous to assuming, in some forms of set theory with urelements, 
that everything is a set); with this understanding, (8') reduces to the simple form 
if (M IN)  = (M2N) for every object N, then M1 = M2. (9) 
Note. Notice that this principle of extensionality says only that functions are 
identical iff they take the same values for the same arguments: in the case of 
propositional functions it does not say that properties which apply to the same 
objects are identical, since for that we would also require that equivalent 
propositions are identical, which is not only true on our conception, but would 
give a contradiction if we assumed it. (A form of the Russell paradox can easily 
be constructed by considering the set R =-{xlx e x = 4}.) R e R is certainly a 
proposition, since it is the same thing as R e R = 4, and we are assuming that 
M = N is a proposition for any objects M and N. If R e R, then R e R is a true 
proposition and is nevertheless the same thing as the false proposition 4 .  So 
R e R is not a true proposition and so, since we have seen that it is a proposition, 
it is a false one. By the principle of extensionality under discussion (that 
equivalent propositions are identical) R e R is the same proposition as 4 ,  since 
both are false and consequently each implies the other. Hence R e R = ± so 
R • R is a true proposition and _1_ is a true proposition as well, contradiction.) 
This argument shows that (granted that M = N is always a proposition for any 
objects M and N) it cannot be the case (compatibly with (7)) that any two 
equivalent propositions are identical; and this shows that the well-known 
extensionality principle (9) for functions does not imply what is usually called the 
extensionality principle for sets. 
Combinatory logic is a theory related to the Z-calculus; like the latter, it has 
various forms depending partly on the form of extensionality assumed. It 
introduces k-terms satisfying (7) by definition in terms of certain functions called 
combinators; we shall use the combinators S and K where S is 
and K is 
(2x)((Zy)((Zz)((xz)(yz)))) 
(Zx)((Zy)x) 
Notice that if we omit parentheses with association to the left, i.e., if we write xyz 
for ((xy)z), xyzw for (((xy)z)w) etc., we get the characterizing formulas for S 
and K 
and 
Sxyz = xz(yz) (10) 
Kxy =x. (11) 
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If now we define 
I = SKK 
we get 
I x  = SgKx  = = x .  
So I is the identity function on everything. 
S and K will suffice to build up all ).-terms; more precisely, given any ).-term 
M, there is a term with the same meaning built up by functional application from 
S, K and whatever variables are present in the given term. This is easily shown by 
induction if we define 
()-x)a =- Ka if a is an atomic constant or a 
variable distinct from x, 
(Ax)x -  I (=-SKK), 
(,kx)(ab ) - S( (,kx)a)(()-x )b ). 
We will now give a brief summary of that part of combinatory logic which we 
will need in the sequel; it is the basic part of the formalism of Frege structures, 
which are obtained by adding further objects and structure to combinatory logic. 
The reader is referred to Barendregt [4] for details omitted here. 
1.1. Definition. The set of (combinatory) terms over A is defined inductively as 
follows: 
(i) each element of A is a term; 
(ii) the combinators K and S are terms; 
(iii) the variables v0, vl, • • • are terms; 
(iv) if M and N are terms, so is (MN).  
A term is called closed if it contains no variables. We will write AA for the set 
of combinatory terms over A and A ° for the set of closed combinatory terms over 
A. 
In order to simplify notation, it will be convenient o adopt the above 
convention whereby parentheses are omitted with association to the left. Thus, 
MNI " " " Nk abbreviates ( ( - - - (MN1) . . . )Nk) .  
Since there are no variable binding operations in the construction of the terms 
of A, we can define substitution in the obvious way. The result of substituting N
for all occurrences of v in M will be denoted by M[v := N]. 
The formal system of combinatory logic relative to a given set A of constants, 
denoted by CL(A) or just CL, is an equational system. The formulas of CL are all 
equations (M = N) for M, N e A~t. 
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Rules and axioms of  CL 
S SMNQ = MQ(NQ) ,  r M = M, 
K KMN = M, M = M'  
s 
M = M'  M '  = M'  
a 
(MN)=(M'N) '  M=N N=Q 
t 
N=N'  M=Q 
b 
(MN)  - (MN' ) '  
A proof in CL is an appropriately formed tree of equations. We will write 
eL  I- (M = N) 
if there is a proof in CL with bottom node (M = N). 
There are two important extensions of combinatory logic which will be 
considered below. These extensions correspond to two notions of extensional 
equality for functions. 
The rule of  extensionality is the schema 
ext Mx = Nx 
M = N provided x does not occur in M or N. 
The w-rule is the schema 
to MP = NP  for all closed terms P 
M=N 
We denote by CL + ext and CL + to the systems obtained from CL by adding the 
rule ext or to respectively. It is natural in the formulation of EL + to to restrict he 
language by allowing only dosed terms. 
A word is in order here concerning the relation between ext and to. ext is a 
fmitary rule, hence the set of (G6del numbers) of theorems (provable identities) 
of CL(A)+ ext is r.e. (If A is infinite it must be countable for this remarks to 
make sense; and if A = {A0, A1, A2 , . . .  } there must be a recursive function f
such that f ( i )  is the GSdel number of Ai. ) This will be important in the proof of 
some independence results later on. For A empty, the rules ext and to are not 
equivalent (Plotkin [14]; the proof is hard). We do not know if the set of 
theorems of CL(I~)+ to is r.e.; Barendregt conjectures plausibly that it is not. 
Obviously, if an equation M=N (dosed) is provable in CL(A)+ ext, it is 
likewise provable in CL(A) + to. For A infinite, the converse also holds, as is seen 
as follows. Let F be a proof of M = N (closed) in CL(A) + to. By induction on the 
height of the proof-tree (in general a transfinite ordinal) we shall show how to 
obtain a proof of M = N in CL(A)+ ext. The basis is trivial, and so is the 
inductive step unless M = N is obtained by to. In that case by the inductive 
hypothesis there is a proof in eL(A) + ext of MP = NP  for all closed terms P. In 
particular eL(A) + ext proves MPo = NPo for some P0 e A not occurring in M or 
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N. (It is here that we use the infinity of A.) In the proof of MPo = NPo, replace all 
occurrences of P0 by some variable x. It is possible that the proof of MPo = NPo in 
CL(A) + ext contains variables, but since that proof is only finitely long we can 
pick x to be distinct from all these. The result of this replacement of P0 by x is, or 
can easily be made into, a proof in CL(A) + ext of Mx = Nx; the derived result 
M = N can now be inferred by ext. We do not know the relation between 
CL(A) + ext and CL(A) + ~ when A is finite but non-empty. 
The basic information about CL that will be needed is summarized in the 
following definitions and theorems. 
r 
1.2. Combinatory Completeness. For any term M of AA and any variable v, there 
is a term denoted by 3.v.M and called the 3.-abstraction of M with respect o v, 
satisifying 
F(3.v.M)N = M[v := N], 
for any term N. (Proof. See the definition of 3. after (10)-(11).) 
1.3. Fixed Point Theorem. There is a term f of A satisfying 
F M(fM) = (fM) 
for any term M. (Proof. Take f=-(3.v)[((Lr,)v(xx))((Llc)v(xx))].) 
The natural numbers can be represented by certain closed terms of CL. We 
need some notation: 
(i) B ~ Zxyz x(yz), 
(ii) I = Zx.x, 
(iii) 0 - (KI), 
(iv) o = SB. 
(Note that FOfx=x and F (on)fx =f(nfx).)  
1.4. Definition. The mapping ( - ):~--* A ° is defined inductively by the clauses: 
(i) 0 = O, 
(ii) n + 1 = (oh). 
(The motivation is that nfx = f ~ fx. Henceforth we'll write p for nf whenever 
appropriate.) . times 
1.5. Definition by Cases. There is a closed term a such that for all terms M, N of 
AA, 
(i) F OOMN = M, 
(ii) F a(oP)MN = N. 
Proof. Set a-~ Zx 3.m 3.n (Kn)Xm and use the remarks preceding and following 
1.4. 
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1.6. Pairing. There are closed terms :t, :to, :t~ of  A such that for all terms M, N of  
Am 
~- :to(:tMN) = M, and F :tl(:tMN) = N. 
Proof. Set :~=-(2x)(Zy)(Zz)zxy, : t0-(Zx)(xK),  : t l - (~c) (x (K l ) ) .  
We often write (M, N) for :tMN. 
1.7. Double Fixed Point Theorem. There are closed terms d and d' of  A such that 
for all terms M, N of  AA 
b M(dMN)(d 'MN)  = dMN, and F N(dMN)(d 'MN)  = d'MN. 
Proof. Obtain by 1.3 Xm,, for which 
[- Stun -- (m(:t lXmn)(:t2Xmn),  n(:t lXmn)(:t2Xmn) ) 
and then set d - (Zm)(Zn):tlXm,,, d' =- (Zm)(Zn):tzXm,,. 
2. Combinatory structures 
The construction of Aczel's 'Frege Structures' takes place in two stages, which 
will be paralleled in the present text. First comes a type of structure called 
combinatory structures, which is our immediate concern in this section; the 
derivation of Frege structures from combinatory structures is carried out in 
Section 4 below. In both cases we shall depart from Aczel's own definitions in 
minor ways which simplify the arguments without spoiling anything essential. 
Aczel's definition of combinatory structures in [2] is an involved and on first 
reading somewhat puzzling affair: a combinatory structure is a sequence 
• @, ~-1, ~2, • • • of sets, where ~ = ~i  _...> ~,  together with a distinguished element 
App e ~z and a map 4: ~---> ~ satisfying certain closure conditions. Intuitively 
is the 'base set' of a model of combinatory logic which may or may not have 
urelements as well as k-terms or combinators: ~/is the family of 'definable' maps 
~---~ ~ in a suitable sense: App is the application map in the combinatory logic 
(so that App(x, y) is what we called (xy) in Section 1): and Z is a map which 
associates to every 'definable map' f: ,@---> ,@ the corresponding k-term in ~. For 
example, if f is the identity map on ~, then Zf is the element of ~ which we have 
hitherto denoted by I or (Zx)x; if a is any element of ~ and g is the map whose 
value is a for every element of ~ as argument, hen (Zg) is what we have hitherto 
denoted by (gx)a or Ka, and so on. Aczel does not require that every element of 
be of the form Zf for some f e ~1; we shall simplify the arguments, without 
losing any significant generality, by imposing this requirement. This does not 
mean giving up the urelements (which for technical reasons we shall need from 
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time to time): for example we could identify every urelement A with (Zx)A or 
KA. 
With this restriction it is a routine (though tedious) process to check that 
Aczel's combinatory structures are simply models of combinatory logic satisfying 
the to role of 1.1. The sets ~1, ~2" • • can be forgotten, since if ~/is needed it can 
be defined as the set of all functions ~i___> ~ defined by 
f (x l ,  . . . , xi) - t(xl, . . . ,  xi) (x l , . . .  , X i E ~)  
where t is built up from the variables indicated (possibly not all of those), 
together with names of elements of ~, by means of App. Our emphasis 
henceforth will thus be on models of combinatory logic, which we shall call 
combinatory algebras; those which also satisfy the to rule will be called extensional 
combinatory algebras or combinatory structures. We proceed to develop the 
beginnings of this theory. 
2.1. Definition. An applicative algebra is a structure M = (A,  .), where • is a 
binary operation on A. 
2.2. Definition. An applicative system M is a combinatory algebra if there are 
elemets k, s e A satisfying: 
(i) k 4: s; 
(ii) for all x, y in A, kxy = x; 
(iii) for all x, y, z in A, sxyz = xz(yz) .  
Suppose M is a combinatory algebra. By the combinatory terms over M, we 
understand the set of terms AA. 
2.3. Definition. For each dosed combinatory term M over M we define the value 
of M, denoted IIMII, inductively as follows: 
(i) for a cA,  Ilall =a; 
(ii) IIKII = k and IISII = s;  
(iii) II(MN)II = IIMII" IINII. 
It will be convenient to confuse a dosed term of AA with the element of A that 
it denotes. We adopt this identification in the statement of the theorems below. 
Also, we shall use x • y and (xy) interchangeably. 
2.4. Soundness Theorem for ~t. For any closed terms M, N of  AA 
CL(A) ~- (M = N) ~ M = N. 
(Proof. Induction on the length of the proof of M = N.) 
2.5. Combinatory Completeness for ~t. Suppose M(v l ,  . . . , vn) is a term o f  AA. 
44 R.C. Flagg, J. Myhil l  
There is an element of A, denoted by ~.v l ' "  vn .M(V l ' ' '  Vn)  such that for all 
a l ,  . • • , an in A 
(1.v.M(v))a = M(a). 
(Cf. the definition of 2 after (10)-(11).) 
2.6. Fixed Point Theorem for ~.  There is an element f of A such that for all a in 
A, 
a(fa) = (fa). (Cf. 1.3.) 
2.7. Definition. By the natural numbers of the combinatory algebra M we 
understand the set 
= {11 11; n e N}. 
(Here h is the numeral for n, i.e. 0 preceded by n or's; and Ilhll is the element of 
A denoted by this term; cf. 1.4.) 
2.8. Definition by cases for ~.  
p,a,  be~t ,  
(i) aOab = a, 
(ii) a(op)ab = b. 
There is an element a of M such that for all 
2.9. Pairing in ~.  There are elements 11, 11o, 111 ~ A satisfying for all lz, b ~ A, 
(i) 11o(Hab ) = a, 
(ii) 11~(Hab) = b. 
(We will usually write (a, b } for I-lab; cf. 1.6.) 
2.U. Double Fixed Point Theorem for ~.  There are elements d, d' ~ A such that 
for all a, b ~ A,  
(i) a(dab)(d'ab) = (dab), 
(ii) b(dab)(d'ab)=(d'ab).  (Cf. 1.7.) 
2.12. Lemma. The natural numbers of  M are all distinct; i.e., if m and n are 
distinct natural numbers, then I1'~11 * I1~11. 
Proof. Without loss of generality assume m > n. (As we promised in 2.3, we shall 
abuse notation a bit in this proof.) Define t=-(Zx){a(111x),111x). Then 
t°(0, 0) = (0, 0) and for each natural number n >0,  t~(0, 0) = (n, n - 1). 
Define p~Zx Hl(t~(0, 0)); then for each natural number n>0,  ph=n-1 .  
Define minus =--2x 2ypYx; then for any natural numbers a and b, minus ti/~ 
(henceforth [~ -/~]) is ~ax(a -b ,  0). In particular [rh -h ]  is m -n ,  i.e., ou for 
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some natural number u of M, while [ rh -  rh] is 0. Assume now for reductio ad 
absurdum that rh = h in M (i.e. Ila ll = I1~11); then by 2.8 
K = OOKS = O[ff~ - rh]KS = O[rh - h]KS = O(au)KS = S 
contradicting 2.2. 
2.13. Definition. A number-theoretic function 
F: Nk---> N 
is said to be definable in ~ if for some element/~ of A, we have for all natural 
numbers h i ,  • • - , nk, m 
F(nl ,  . . . , nk)= m <=> (Fnl""" hk)= rh. 
2.14. Theorem. Al l  recursive number-theoretic functions are definable in M. (See 
Barendregt [4, p. 134].) 
The notions of extensionality discussed for combinatory logic suggest he 
consideration of special combinatory algebras. 
2.15. Definition. Let ~t be a combinatory algebra. 
(1) M is said to be extensional or a combinatory structure if the following 
condition is satisfied: 
for all a, b eA:  Vx (ax=bx) :~a=b.  
These are the kind of structures on which Frege structures are built. 
(2) M is said to be strongly extensional if the following condition is satisfied: for 
all a, b • A, if aM = bM for all closed terms M of pure combinatory logic, then 
a=b.  
The Soundness Theorem extends in the expected way to extensional and 
strongly extensional combinatory algebras. 
2.16. Soundness Theorem for Extensional 
closed terms M, N of  AA, 
CL(A) + ext F (M = N) ~ M = N. 
Combm~o~ Algebras. For any 
2.17. Soundness Theorem for Strongly Extensional Combinatory Algebras. For 
any closed terms M, N of AA, 
CL(A  ) + to ~ (M = N)  ~ M = N. 
Scott's lattice-theoretic models provide examples of strongly extensional 
combinatory algebras. (See Scott [16].) 
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2.18. Theorem. There exists an extensional combinatory algebra which is not 
strongly extensional. 
2.19. Theorem. There exists a strongly extensional combinatory algebra. 
We shall give proofs of these theorems which are independent of Scott's work. 
For 2.18, consider the term model of CL(A) + to, where A is an infinite set; i.e. 
consider the applicative system (A, .), where ,d is the set of equivalence classes of 
closed terms of CL(A) modulo provable identity in CL(A); i.e. we define 
[a] ------ {b I CL(A) F a = b }, for every closed term a of CL(A), 
= {[a] I a a closed term of CL(A)}, 
[a]. [b]-[(ab)], 
k-[IC], s - IS ]  
Then conditions (ii) and (iii) of 2.2 are trivially satisfied, as is the condition of 
2.15(1) which is merely a restatement of rule to. Condition (i) of 2.2 is satisfied 
since if CL(A) + to F K = S it would be inconsistent, and CL + to has been shown 
to be consistent (see e.g. Barendregt [4]). The presence of the additional 
urelements in CL(A)+to  makes no difference, since any inconsistency in 
CL(A) ÷ to could be turned into an inconsistency in CL + to by replacing those 
urelements by arbitrary closed terms. Finally Plotkin's counterexample [14] shows 
that our model is not strongly extensional. 
Likewise we prove 2.19 by using the term model of CL + to. 
Notice that we used the consistency of CL + to in the above. If we had started 
with Scott's models we could have proceeded in the reverse order and used them 
to prove consistency. 
For some of the constructions in later parts of this paper we will need to 
consider a special class of combinatory algebras. This class includes closed term 
models for various combinatory logics. 
2.20. Definition. A combinatory algebra ~¢ is called effective if there exists an 
element E of A, a unary recursive function Num, and a binary recursive function 
Ap, such that the following conditions are satisfied. 
(i) For all a e ~/there is an n e N for which (En) = a. 
(ii) For all n in N (E Num(n)) = n. 
(iii) For all m, n in N, E Ap(m, n) = (Em)(En). 
2.21. Theorem. The closed term model of CL (or CL(w))/s effective. 
Proof .  Let  
j: [~ x ~ on~--one >[~ _ {0, 1} 
onto  
Implication and analysis in classical Frege structures 47 
be a (primitive) recursive function satisfying j(m, n )> m, n and let q, l be its 
(primitive) recursive inverses, i.e., qj(m, n) = m, lj(m, n) = n for j(m, n) >I 2. j 
induces an onto G6del numbering of the closed terms of CL(CL(w)), namely 
IS ] =0,  [K 1 = 1, [(AB) 1 =j( fA 1, [B1). 
Let J be a closed term of CL resp. CL(w) which defines j in the sense that for any 
numerals rh, n, r, CL resp. CL(¢o) kJrhh = ~ iff j(m, n) = r; likewise let Q and L 
define q and l respectively. Using 1.3, find a closed term E for which 
k Ea = OaS(c~(pa)K(E(Qa)(E(La)))) 
where O is as in 1.5 and p (predecessor) is as in the proof of 2.12. By induction on 
rM1 (M a closed term) we readily prove kErM 1 = M, i.e., (i). 
For (ii) we define Num(0)= r01, Num(n + 1)=j ( ra l ,  Num(n)); and for (iii) we 
take Ap to be ]. 
2.22. Theorem. The closed term model of CL(A) or CL(A) + o~/s effective if A is 
finite but not if A is infinite. 
Proof. The first part is proved just like 2.21; the second part is obvious since if 
Ao, Ai, A2 , . . .  is the sequence of urelements, there are at most a finite number 
of A's, namely those occurring in E, such that k E(h) = A for some numeral n. 
2.23. Theorem. By adding one atom to CL(A) (etc.) with an infinite A, we can 
make its term-model effective. 
Proof. Let E, Ao, A1, A 2 etc. be the elements of A. Let j be a (primitive) 
recursive bijection of N onto the odds with the property that if m is odd, then 
m <j(m, n) for every n and if n is odd, then n <j(m, n) for every m. Let q and l 
be its two inverses, i.e. qj(m, n) = m and qj(m, n) = n if ](m, n) is odd, and let 
them also be (primitive) recursive. Let J, Q and L define j, q and l respectively. 
Adjoin to the usual axioms for CL(A) the following: 
E(0)  = E, = ao, = A1 , . . .  
and 
E(Ha) = E(QHa)(E(LHa))  
where H defines the function 2n + 1. Num and Ap are defined as in 2.21. 
3. The formal system ~" 
The language of ,~ is an extension of that of combinatory logic. The primitive 
symbols are the following: 
(i) The combinators K, S. 
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(ii) The equality symbol =. 
(iii) The logical symbols --1, A, V. 
(iv) The predicate symbol N. 
(v) The variables v0, vl, . . . .  
(vi) The parentheses ( , ) .  
3.1. Definition. The terms of 27 are defined inductively by the following clauses: 
(i) Each variable is a term. 
(ii) The primitive symbols K, S, =, -a, A, V, N are terms. 
(iii) If M and N are t6rms, then (MN) is a term. 
The notation introduced for combinatory logic will also be used for 27. We will 
often use the infix notation [MfN] instead of (fMN). For example, 
[M = N] = (=MN)  and [M A N] = (A MN). 
The brackets [ ] will sometimes be omitted if this does not cause confusion. 
Since the combinators K and S are available in the language of 27, we can 
construct ).-abstraction terms as we did for CL. We write 
Zx l . . . x , , .M  for ZXl.---.Zxn.M. 
Using Z-abstraction, the other logical connectives can be defined in terms of 
~, A, and V. 
( i )  v - -  Xpq.m[mp Amq], 
(ii) ~ = Zpq.~[p A "~q], 
(iii) a --= Ztp.-aVAx.-a(q)x). 
The natural numbers are defined in ~7 as in CL. 
Finally, we write 
D =- ,~p.[p v ~p]. 
For any term M, (DM) is read as "M is definite". 
27 is formulated as a system of natural deduction. Derivations are written in 
tree form. The top terms are either axioms or assumptions, and the other terms 
of the tree are to follow from the ones immediately above by one of the inference 
rules. Our notation is taken from Prawitz [15]. 
The axioms and rules of 27 
Combinators 
K KMN = M 
S SMNQ = MQ(NQ) 
Equality 
F M=M Sb 
M=N P=Q 
MP = NQ 






[M = N] v 7M = N] 
Logic 















provided x does not 
appear in any open 
assumption or in M 
"7(MN) 
~(VM) 
Y~x [(Mx) v N] 
(VM) v N 
provided x does not 







Mo A M, 
M~ (i=0, 1) 
{-~Mo} 












provided x does not occur 
in N or any open assumption 










MO (~' Mx) 
M(ox) 
.MN 
(NM) v ~(NM) 
NN 
There are natural extensions of the system X corresponding to various notions 
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of equality for functions. The rule of  extensionality is the schema 
ext 
Mx = Nx  
M=N 
provided x does not occur in any open assumption or MN. 
We denote by 27 + ext the system obtained from 27 by adding the rule of 
extensionality. This in fact is the system we shall usually be working in. 
We could also consider adjoining the non-finitary rule 
to 
MQ = NQ all closed terms Q 
M=N 
where M and N are closed. It is not clear that this would strengthen the system. If 
there were an infinite number of primitives other than the combinators, it is easy 
to see that rule to gives nothing new: for if MQ = NQ is provable in Z + ext + the 
new primitives for every Q, and in particular for a primitive A not occurring in M 
or N, then a straightforward induction on the length of proof shows that Mx = Nx 
is provable in the said system, from which M = N is obtainable by ext, without 
using to. We do not know the power of to when there are only finitely many 
noncombinators present. 
4. Frege structures 
We turn now to the appropriate model-theoretic notion corresponding to the 
system 27. This notion is due to Peter Aczel and is essentially what he calls an 
'N-standard Frege structure' in [2]. There are various inessential differences 
between his version and ours (for instance, he has in addition to the distinguished 
subset O- of truths another distinguished subset ~ of propositions; but we can 
easily define that so as to have the properties he requires of it). The big difference 
between his notion in [2] and ours is that he uses an intuitionistic metalanguage; 
this has the effect that he cannot prove that the rule v V holds in the Frege 
structures he discusses. However in [3] he uses a classical metalanguage and in 
fact a rule corresponding to v V is a derived rule of the formalism which he 
presents there. We now define the notion of (classical) Frege structure: 
4.1. Definition. A Frege structure ~ consists of a combinatory algebra M, 
elements N, - ,  ~ ^,  V of A and a subset 0-of  A such that the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(i) [a - b] 6 ffC:~a = b. 
(ii) ~[a -b]  E ~-¢:~a4~b. 
(iii) (Na) e ~-¢:>a e N. 
(iv) ~(Na)  ~ O"¢:~a ~ N. 
(v) [a A b] ~ Jcz>a e ~ & b ~ ~-. 
(vi) ~[a ^  b] ~ ffc:~ (-ha) ~ ff or (~b) e 3. 
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(vii) (Va) e 3-¢:>for all b, (ab) ~ 3-. 
(viii) -n(Va) e 3-<:>for some b, -n(ab) e 3-. 
(ix) ~a  e 3-<:>a e 3-. 
(x) 2 For no a do we have a, -aa e 3-. 
The main result of this section is that any combinatory algebra can be enlarged 
to a Frege structure. A standard inductive definability construction will be used to 
prove this. The method is an adaption of Aczel's proof of a similar result in [2]. 
Let ~ = (A, -, k, s) be a combinatory algebra. Define elements - ' ,  N, --1, A,  
V of A as follows: 
(i) -=~.xy.(O,x, y), 
(ii) N=Xx.(1, x), 
(iii) ~ = Zx.(2, x) ,  
(iv) ^ = Zxy.(3, x, y ) ,  
(v) V = 2x.(4, x) .  
These objects have a certain ' independence property'.  For example we never 
have [a -b]=(~c)  and if [a ^ b ]  = [a'  ^ b ' ] ,  thena=a' and b = b'. We will not 
formulate this property explicitly; but special cases will be used repeatedly in the 
arguments below• 
It remains to find 
structure. 3- will be 
describe the operator 
a set 9 -so  that (sg,- ,  N, ~, ^ ,  V, 3-) becomes a Frege 
the least fixed point of an inductive operator ~-. We will 
~- by axioms and rules of inference. 
ao al -aai (i =0,  1). 




ab a l lbeA ~(ab ) somebeA 
Wl , -awl 
Va ~(Va) 
The set 3- then is the smallest set containing all instances of the axioms - - ,  -a=, 
N and -aN and closed under the rules A I, "IA I, "raI, Wl, and -aWl. 
The stages in the inductive generation of 3- will be indicated in the usual way 
by F ~ and F<'L Thus 
(i) I-<= = Ut~<= Fa, 
(ii) t-~= F(F<"), 
(iii) 3- = U,~ FL 
We will abuse notation by writing Fa if a ~ 3-, F'~a if a ~ I -~ and b <~ if a e b <~. 
2 (x) is not derivable from (i)-(ix). For example, let f f  be the least set containing R e R and closed 
under (i)-(ix); then R E R an~[R e R] (which is the same thing) are both in ft. 
= [a=a]  fo raeA,  --1= -a[a=b] fora, beAwitha=/:b. 
N (Na) for a e N~, -aN -a(Na) for a e A - Nz. 
Axioms and rules for F 
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Using the independence property discussed above, one easily establishes the 
following 'invertibility properties' of the logical symbols. 
A- Invers ion :  
--1 ^  - Invers ion:  
-7-7-Inversion: 
V - Invers ion :  
-~V-Inversion : 
F'~[a ^  b] ~ F<'~a & F<~b. 
F~[a  ^  b] ==> F<~(-~a) or F<~(Tb). 
F ~-7(-aa) ==> F < ~a. 
F~(Va) ==> for all b e A, F<~(ab). 
F ~-~(Va) ==> for some b e A, F <~ 7(ab) .  
If we define 3 and v as in Section 3, we at once obtain: 
v - Invers ion:  
::]-Inversion: 
F~[a v b] ~ F<~'a or F<=b. 
F=3a f f for  some b e A, F<°'(ab). 
4.2. Theorem. Any combinatory  algebra can be enlarged to a Frege structure. 
Proof. We need to show that the set ff defined above satisfies conditions (i)-(x) 
of Definition 4.1. The invertibility results above together with the fact that 0- is a 
fixed point of the operator F easily yield conditions (v)-(ix). Of the first four 
conditions we consider only (1), the other being similar. If a = b, then we have 
[a - b] ~ 0- by axiom =.  Conversely if [a - b] e ~-, then this is on account of one 
of the rules of axioms. Because of the independence property discussed above the 
axiom - must be the reason, and consequently a = b. Finally condition (x) is 
satisfied because if F°'a and F°'~a, then FOb and F#~b for some b and for some 
< [] 
We will call the Frege structure constructed above the Frege structure associated 
with the combinatory algebra M, and it will be denoted by .~(A). 
Any Frege structure provides a model for 27, in the following sense: if there is a 
proof of F(Xl ,  . . . , x , )  with the hypotheses Al(Xl ,  . . . , xn), . . •,  Ak(Xl ,  • • . ,  X,)  
in 27, where no free variables beyond xx,. • •, x, occur in the premises A i or in 
the conclusion F, and if A1 , . . . , .4 ,  are such that each of 
AI(Ax,  . . . ,  An), . . .  , Ak (A1 , . . . ,  An) denotes (in the obvious sense) an element 
of ~-, then so does F(A1 , . . . ,  ,4,).  The  proof is by straightforward induction on 
the length of the proof of F, with a subdivision into cases according to the rule by 
which F was obtained. Notice that if F was obtained by rule vV ,  we have to use 
classical ogic in the metalanguage to establish this (Subcase 1: MQ is in J for 
every closed Q; Subcase 2: there is a closed Q for which MQ is not in if; then N 
is in if, etc.). Consequently the above does not constitute a constructive proof of 
the following. 
4.3. Corollary. The fo rmal  sys tem 27 is consistent. 
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Combining 4.2 with 2.12 and 2.13 gives the following two results. 
4.4. Corollary. The system ~, + ext is consistent. 
4.5. Corollary. The semi-formal system ~ + to is consistent. 
The result 4.5 is not too interesting, since the Frege structure which 'models' 
+ o~ has no indeterminates (it contains only combinators and combinations of 
such) and hence Plotkin's bizarre identity holds in it. 
5. Representablility in Frege structures 
Suppose ~ is a Frege structure over a combinatory algebra ~t. 
5.1. Definition. Let R be an n-ary relation on A. 
(i) We say R is representable in ~ if for some element /~ in A, for all 
a l ,  • • • , an 
R(a)C~F(Ra). 
where (/~a) means Ral ' "an .  
(ii) We say R is completely representable in ~ if for some element/~ in A, for 
all a l ,  • . . , an 
R(a)<:~(l~a), and -~R(a)~F~(Ra). 
In this section we want to characterize those relations representable in Frege 
structures of the form ,~(M). It will be shown that these are exactly the inductive 
relations over the structure (M, N). The set ~ then provides a simply constructed 
universal inductive relation for (M, N). 
We review briefly some elementary results about inductive definability; for 
details the reader is referred to Moschovakis [11]. 
Let M+ denote the structure (M, N). 
5.2. Definition. The language of ~+, denoted ~÷,  has the following descriptive 
constants: 
(i) individual constants ~for each a e A, 
(ii) a binary function symbol -, 
(iii) the unary predicate N. 
In addition to the language ~÷,  we will need to consider certain extensions 
obtained from .Ta÷ by adding a new n-ary predicate symbol R. This extension 
will be denoted by .T~÷(R). Since the discussion of this section is restricted to the 
single structure M+, we can write .T and .T(R) without causing any confusion. 
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Terms and formulas  of ~ and ~(R)  are defined in the usual way with the 
logical symbols --1 A, V, :1, '¢ and the equality symbol = taken as primitives. 
5.3. Definition. The class of R-posit ive formulas of ~(R)  is defined by recursion. 
(i) If q9 is an atomic formula of ~,  then q9 and ~q9 are R-positive. 
(ii) For any terms fi, . . . ,  tr, R(ta, . . . ,  tr) is R-positive; 
(iii) If qg, ~p are R-positive, then so are (q9 A ~/,), (q9 V ~p), HX q9 and Vx qg. 
5.4. Definition. An operator 
is called posit ive elementary over M +, if there is an 
tp (v l , . . . ,  Vr, R )  such that 
(a) s], 
for any S ~ A r and any a l ,  . . . , a r E A .  
Monotonicity Property o f  Posit ive Elementary Operators. 
elementary operator over M, then F is monotone: 
S ~_ T ~ F (S)  ~_ r (T ) .  
R-positive formula 
If F is a positive 
Given any monotone operator F we define sets I~- ~ and l~r for each ordinal ~ by 
transfinite recursion: 
I~ -e= U If, and I e=F(I~e).  
The least f ixed po int  of F, denoted Ir,  is then given by 
=Or . 
t~ 
5.5. Definition. An n-ary relation P, on A is called inductive over M + if there 
are elements al, • • •, ak of A and a positive elementary operator 
F: ~(Ak+")--~ (A  k+") 
such that for all xl, • • •, x. in A 
P(Xl  " " x.)<:>(al " " " ak, Xl " " " x . )  e Ir. 
Any term t of ~ can be interpreted in the obvious way as an element of the set 
AA of combinatory terms over A. Under this identification, for any closed term t 
of ~,  the 'value of t' in the model M + agrees with Iltll. Our next definition 
extends this interpretation to the formulas of Le(R). 
5.6. Delinition. The mapping 
( . )n .  formulas of ~(R)--> AA 
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is defined by the following recursion: 
(i) (tl = t2)  # = [t I = t2], 
(ii) N(t )  n = (~t ) ,  
(iii) R(t l ,  . . . , t , )  n = (R#tx  . . . tn)  , 
(iv) (-nip) n = (-atpn), 
(v) ^ ^ 
(vi) (q9 v W) n - -  [cp n v apn], 
(vii) (By cp(v)) n = 3v  qgn(v), 
(viii) (Vv cp(v)) n = Vv  cpn(v). 
In clause (iii), R n denotes ome variable not occurring in any of t l , . . . ,  t,. 
5.7. Lemma. Let qg(v l , . . . ,  Vk) be a formula o f  ~ with free variables among 
these shown.  Then for  all aa, • • •,  ak in A ,  
[-99~t(a1 " ' "  ak) <:> M + ~ qg[a l ' ' -  ak]. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of % 
5.8. Theorem. I f  P is an elementary relation on M +, then P is completely 
representable in o~( M). 
Proof. If P is defined by the formula qg(Vl"'" Vk) , then by Lemma 5.7, the 
element ,~v 1 • • • v k. qg#(vl • • • Vk) will completely represent P [] 
5.9. Theorem. Let  cp(v l , . . . ,  Vk, R )  be an R-posit ive formula. Then for  any 
elements al,  . . . , ak and r o f  A ,  we have 
F-cpn(al, . . . , ak, r)<=~ M + ~ cp[al, . . . , ak, ( (b l ' - "  b,): ~-rb}]. 
Proof. The argument is again by induction on the complexity of % For q9 atomic 
or negated atomic, R does not occur and the result follows from Lemma 5.7. 
Suppose q9 -= R(t l (V ) ,  . . . ,  tn(v)). Then 
t-q0#(a, r)C=~-rq(a).  . tn(a) 
¢~ (q (a ) ,  . . . , tn (a ) )  ~ {b: ~-rb}  
¢=> M+ ~ q0[a, (b:Vrb}].  
The other cases are easily proved on the basis of the induction hypothesis and the 
invertibility properties of the logical symbols. [] 
5.10. Lemma. Let  cp(V l , . . . ,  Vk, R )  be an R-posit ive formula. 
elements al,  . . . , ak and r o f  A and any ordinal et 
V~tp#(a, r)=> ~t+ V q0[a, {b: ~rb)l. 
Then for  any 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of % If tp is atomic, the result follows 
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from 5.7. Suppose tp - R(q(v ) , . . . ,  tn(n)), then 
F"tp#(a, r) ~ F~rtl(a), . . . , tn(a) 
(ta(a), . . . , tn(a)) ~ {b: F<~rb} 
~+ ~ q~[a, (b: :rb}]. 
The other cases are again handled using the invertibility properties. [] 
5.11. Theorem. Suppose F is a positive elementary operator on sg +. Then Ir is 
representable in ~(  ~l). 
Proof. Let cp(V l , . . . ,  Vn, R)  be an R-positive formula satisfying: for all S cA  n 
and all a~, . . . ,  an e A, 
(al, . . . , an) ~ F(S)¢:> ~g+ ~ cp[a, S]. 
Define/~ = ;~R#v. cp#(n, R#). 
(1) 
Using the Fixed Point Theorem for M, choose z so that for all a l , . .  •, an, r in 
A, 
(zra) = [[k = k] A (rzr)a] 
Finally, let c = (z/~). We claim c represents It. Using Theorem 5.9 and (1) above, 
we obtain 
Fca ¢:~ F_rca 
¢:> Fqo#(a, c) 
¢~ s~+ ~ qg[a, {b: Fcb}] 
¢~(a) ~ r((b: Fcb}). 
Thus {b: Fcb} is a fixed point of F; and so Ir~= {b: Fcb}. To show also that 
{b: Fcb} ~= It,  we prove by induction on a~ that 
F ~cb ==> (b) e 6. 
Assume F%b. Then by A-inversion F<~qg#(b, c) and by Lemma 5.10, 
s~ + ~ q~[b, (a: F<~ca}]. 
Consequently, 
(b) ~ r({a: ~<~ca}). 
Using the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of F, it follows that 
(b) ~ r( / r )  =/r. [] 
5.12. Theorem. A relation R on A is inductive over M + if and only if it is 
representable in ~(~). 
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Proof. The set ~- of theorems of ~(M) is the least fixed point of a positive 
elementary operator over M +, so it forms an inductive set. From this it is 
immediate that all representable relations are inductive. The converse follows 
from 5.11 and the fact that the representable relations are closed under 
'projections'. [] 
6. Complete representability 
In order to characterize those relations completely representable in Frege 
structures of the form ~(M),  we will have to restrict ourselves to the effective 
combinatory algebras discussed in Section 2. In this case, it turns out that the 
completely representable r lations are exactly the hyperelementary elations on 
,~+. 
Our argument makes use of the Relativized Suslin-Kleene Theorem. The 
Suslin-Kleene theorem asserts that the class of A~ relations on N comprises the 
smallest 'effective o-algebra' containing all singletons. For a very readable proof 
of this result, the reader is referred to §8E of Moschovakis [11]. We briefly recall 
some relevant definitions. 
6.1. Definition. For any function Y: N--* ~, the set G[Y] is the smallest subset 
of N satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) For each x e ~, (1, x) e G[ Y]. 
(ii) If a e G[ Y], then (2, a ) e G[ Y]. 
(iii) If e is the code of a total Y-recursive function such that 
for all x, {e}V(x)~G[Y], 
then (3, e) e G[Y]. 
6.2. Definition. By recursion on the generation of G[Y], we define for each 
x e G[Y], a subset of N, denoted Gx[Y], as follows: 
(i) G<I'~>[Y] = {x}, 
(ii) G(2'a)[ Y] = ~ - Ga[ Y], 
(iii) GO">[ Y] = Ux,N G <'> YOo[ y]. 
Let 
Y] = ( G'[ Y]: x G[ Y]). 
One can easily show that ~d[Y] is a 'Y-effective o-algebra' and that it is 
contained in any other Y-effective o-algebra containing the singletons. The 
Relativized Suslin-Kleene Theorem asserts that ~Y]  = AI[Y]. We will need the 
additional fact which is easily extracted from the proof given by Moschovakis that 
one can effectively go from a A~[Y]-index for a set to a G[Y]-index. 
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We define the notion of a :r~[ Y]-index for a subset of ~ using the Normal Form 
Theorem in the standard way. Thus if a is a :r][ Y]-index for X, then 
x eXC:~ Vtr :ls T(a, x, &(s), Y), 
where T is Kleene's T-predicate. 
6.3. Definition. A A~[Y]-index for a subset X of N is a pair (a, b) of numbers 
such that a is a :r][ Y]-index for X and b is a :r~[ Y]-index for [~ - X. 
6.4. Relativized Suslin-Kleene Theorem. There is a total recursive function f 
such that if X is a A~[ Y] subset of ~ with index (a, b ), then f (a, b) ~ G[ Y] and 
Gf (a'b )[ Y] = X. 
With this preliminary result out of the way, we turn to the problem of 
characterizing the completely representable r lations of ~. 
6.5. Definition. Suppose M is an effective combinatory algebra and suppose 
E e A is such that 
Va ~ A :In ~ [~ (En) = a. 
Then (i) The binary relation - on A is defined by 
p - q ¢~ p, q e ~d and (Ep) = (Eq). 
(ii) The function Y: ~---> [~ is defined by: 
Y(x)={01 otherwise.ifxisapair(p'q}&P-q' 
Since the relation - and the graph of Y are elementary on M ÷ we at once 
have: 
6.6. Lemma. The ternary relation 
e,x, ye•& {e}Y(x)~-y 
is completely representable in ~. 
6.7. Proposition. There is an element (~ of A such that for any x ~ G[Y], (Gx) 
completely represents the set GX[ Y]. 
Proof. Using the Fixed Point Theorem for M, we choose (~ so that for any n e t~ 
(i) G(1, n )=~,v .v=n,  
(ii) G(2, n} = ;w.([~V) ^  -n(Gnv), 
(iii) G(3, n) = Zv.3y 3z [(Ny) ^  (Nz) A ({n} V(y)-- z) ^ (Gzv)]. 
The result now follows hY induction on the generation of G[Y]. [] 
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6.8. Definition. With any n-ary relation R on A we associate an n-ary relation, 
R*, on ~ by the prescription: 
g*(p l ,  . . . , p,)cz~ g(Ep l ,  . . . , Epn). 
6.9. Theorem. The set 0"-* is a 1II[ Y] subset of ~. 
Proof. By pulling the definition of i f  back to t~ we see that 3"* is inductive on the 
structure (A, Y) and consequently is II~[Y]. [] 
6.10. Lemma. There is a total unary recursive function g such that for all m e ~, 
g(m) is a II~[ Y]-index for the set 
{n ~ ~: F(Em)(En)}. 
Proof. By the properties of the recursive function Ap, we have 
n e {n e ~: F(Em)(En)} ¢:~ E(Ap(m, n)) ~ 3- 
¢:~ Ap(m, n) e 3-*. 
Consequently the result is clear from Theorem 6.9. [] 
Note that a consequence of 6.10 is that if a represents X ~_ A and Em= a, then 
g(m) is a H~[ Y]-index for X*. 
6.11. Theorem. There is an element L of A such that whenever a and b represent 
X and A - X respectively, then (Lab) completely represents X. 
Proof. Let f be the binary recursive function metnioned in the Relativized 
Suslin-Kleene Theorem. Let g be the unary recursive function of Lemma 6.8. 
Define H by 
H(m, n )=f (g (m) ,  g(n)). 
Then H is a binary recursive function satisfying: 
If (Era) represents X and (En) represents A - X, then H(m, n) e G[ Y] and 
G/-/(m'")[ Y] = X*. 
Now define L by 
L = )~uvw.3xy ~~ [(Ex = u) ^  (Ey = v) ^  3z ~ ~ ((Ez = w) ^  O(I:txy)z)]. 
It is tedious but straightforward to show that L has the required property. [] 
Recall that any n-ary relation R on A is hyper-elementary on ~¢+ if both R and 
(A n -R)  are inductive on M+. Combining 6.11 with Theorem 5.12 gives: 
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6.12. Corollary. The relations completely representable in ~ consist of exactly the 
hyperelementary relation on ~+. 
7. Effective inseparability 
We have seen in Section 5 that the set of theorems ~ of the Frege structure 
~(~)  forms a universal inductive set for the structure ~+. Consequently we can 
index the inductive subsets of ~t + with elements of A by defining 
Aa " "  {b cA:  I-(ab)}. 
With respect o this indexing, there is a natural notion of effective inseparability. 
7.1. Definition. A disjoint pair (T, R) of inductive subsets of A is said to be 
effectively inseparable if for some x0 e A the following condition is satisfied: 
For any a, b e A, if 
(i) T _~ Aa and R ~_ Ab, 
(ii) A~ tq A b = O, 
then (xoab) ~ (Aa U Ab). 
By the refutables of a Frege structure ~, we understand the set 
= {a eA:  k(~a)}. 
For the remainder of this section, let M be a combinatory algebra and let 
= ~(M) be the associated Frege structure. Our next main objective is to show 
that under suitable assumptions the pair (9", ~)  of theorems and refutables of 
is effectively inseparable. To this end, we will need to recall another esult from 
the theory of inductive definability. 
In Section 4, we constructed the set ff of theorems of the Frege structure ~(M) 
as the least fixed point of an inductive operator t-. We can use the stages in the 
inductive generation of I~ to assign ordinals to the elements of ~r as follows: 
[al = least te such that k'~a. 
7.2. Stage Comparison Lemma. The binary relations ~ and <1 defined by 
a~bcr~ba& [~b or lal ~< Ibl] 
and 
a <~bc~ka& [~b or lal < Ibl] 
are inductive over ~t +. 
We now make the additional assumption that the combinatory algebra M is 
effective. Under this assumption the element L of A obtained in Theorem 6.11 
becomes available. We will use this in the next lemma. 
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7.3. Lemma. There is an element < of A satisfying the following condition: 
For any a e A such that ka, the element Zx. [x < a] completely represents the set 
{beA ' l -b& Ibl< al}. 
Proof. For any a such that t-a, we clearly have 
(i)).x.[x "~a] represents {b: I-b & [b[ < [a[}; 
(ii) Zx.[a ~x]  represents A - {b: bb& [b[ < [a[}. 
We may therefore take 
< = Axy.L(Xv.[v ~ y])(Zv.[y <-[ v])x. [] 
7.4. Theorem. The pair (3, ~)  of theorems and refutables of ~ is effectively 
inseparable. 
Proof. Let f be as in the Fixed Point Theorem for M. Take 
Xo = Zxy.f'Zu.(yu) < [(xu) v (yu)]. 
Suppose Aa and Ab are disjoint with 
3-~Aa and ~ ~_A b. 
If q~ = xoab, then 
tp = (b~) < [(a~) v (b~)]. 
We claim tp ~A,  v Ab. For, if ¢ eA~, then ~-(a~) and ~(b~). Thus 
{v: Fv Ivl < [(ate) v (b~)]}. 
Consequently by 7.2, I-~tp. But then ~ e ~ c_Ab, which is absurd. Therefore 
dp ~.Aa. 
On the other hand, if tp cAb, then ~-(b¢) and ¢(aO). So IbO[< I(a )v (bO)[ 
and consequently ~-tp. But then ~ ¢ ~'GAa which is again absurd. Therefore 
dp $ Ab and so ~p C A~ U Ab. [q3 
An important application of the effective inseparability of the theorems and 
refutables of first-order arithmetic is Sheperdson's Theorem on the dual repre- 
sentability of disjoint r.e. relations. Lifting this theorem to Frege Structures i the 
main step in the consistency proof for levels of implication given in Section 8. 
3 Just as the final revisions of this paper were being made, one of us found a much slicker proof of 
7.4 that does not require the use of 'stages'. Namely, let L be as in 6.11 and define U so that 
kUab = {x[0 • L(K(bx))(K(ax))}. Then if x •Ab, K(bx) represents the set of all closed terms and 
K(ax) represents the empty set, so by 6.11 I-x • Ua,. Likewise if x cA,,, I-x ~ U,~. Now choose xo so 
that xoab is a fixed point of Uab, i.e., t-xoab = [(xoab) • U,~]. Then if ~ = xoab were in An, we would 
have I- 4 g Uab, t--'n~p and ~p • R ~_ At,, contradiction; while if it were in At,, we would have bq~ • Uab, 
k~b and ~ • 3" c An, another contradiction. 
However, we let the proof in the text stand, since 'stages' have other uses (see e.g. the discussion of 
inductive definitions at the very end of this paper). 
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7.5. Dual Representability Theorem. There is an element ~ of  A such that 
whenever a and b represent disjoint subsets x and y of  A,  respectively, then the 
element z -- ( ~ab ) satisfies: 
(i) v ~ X <=> Fzv, and 
(ii) v ~ YC:C,~--a(zv) 
for all v ~. A. 4 
Proof. We will describe how to obtain z from a and b. The element ~ can be 
extracted from the proof in the usual way. Let w0 be the element of A witnessing 
the effective inseparability of the pair (3,  9~). Using the Double Fixed Point 
theorem for M, choose elements M and N so that for all x, y in A, 
and 
Let 
(Nyx) = Ix v [(by) ^  x = wo(Ny)(My)]], 
(Myx) = [ -x  v [ (ay)  ^ x = wo(Ny)(My)]]. 
z = wo(Ny) (my) .  
We claim z satisfies conditions (i) & (ii). To see this, suppose v ~ X and ((zv). 
Then the sets 
A(~)  = 3- and A(Mo) = ~ U {zv} 
form a disjoint pair of supersets of 3-& ~. Consequently 
(zv) = wo(Nv)(M~) ¢ (A(lv,,) t_J A(M,,)). 
which is absurd. We obtain 
(1) v ex :>(zv) .  
Similarly, 
(2) v e Y =), ~--~(zv). 
Finally suppose v ~ X t.J ¥. Then 
A(N.) = 3- and A(Mo) = ~Y~. 
Consequently, 
(zv) = wo(Mv)(Mv) ¢ ~- t_J ~.  
This gives 
(3) ( zv )e (3O~) : :>ve(XOY) .  
Combining (1), (2) and (3) we obtain (i) and (ii). [] 
4 An mus ing  corollary is that we can define Scott's grotesque connective 'Squadge' [17]: M squadge 
N is true iff M and N are both true, and false iff they are both false. In terms of that we can define the 
11 monotone truth-functions of one argument and the 1091 monotone truth-functions of two 
arguments. It is easy to see that there is no hope of defining non-monotone truth-functions. 
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8. Levels of implication 
We consider the problem of how to introduce a notion of implication into X. 
The relation p --> q introduced in Section 3 is not an adequate kind of implication; 
it satisfies modus ponens 
M M-->N 
N (1) 




In fact if it did, we would have M-->M, i.e., M v 7M for every term M; taking M 
as RR where R is the Russell property we would get a contradiction. Worse, no 
kind of implication definable in 27, or capable of being consistently added to 2:, 
can satisfy both (1) and (2). This is seen by considering the property {x ] x e x D 
1 =0} (Curry paradox). (Here and henceforth we write {xlA(x)} instead of 
(Xx)A(x), and M e N instead of NM, whenever it makes our formulas more 
legible.) 
We shall use the main result of the preceding section (Theorem 7.5) to define a 
kind of implication which helps to overcome this trouble. It will be called ~0 
(implication of level 0) and the intuitive meaning of M D o N is that N is derivable 
from M in a certain transfinite xtension of 27. Thus it will satisfy (1), but it will 
only satisfy (2) if N was deduced from M in this extension of 27 (not, for example, 
if the deduction of N from M used (1)). We first set up a transfinite xtension of 
2:. Its assertions are of the form F F M, where M is a name of an element of 
certain strongly extensional effective and non-trivial Frege structure ~-and where 
F is a finite (possibily empty) set of such names. Formally: 
The primitive symbols are K, S and possibly an at most countable set of 
constants denoting elements of 4. Formulas are defined by: a primitive symbol is 
a formula and if M and N are formulas, so is (MN). =, N, --1, A, V are defined as 
in Section 4 (after 4.1). Assertions have the form F FM, where F is a finite 
(possibly empty) set of formulas and M is a formula. By calling F a set we mean 
that we do not distinguish F F M, and F '  k M if F '  is obtained from F by repeating 
elements, deleting a repeated element, permuting etc. 
We now give the inductive definition of the nonfinitary system 27*. Except for 
the first two rules, it corresponds closely to the definition of 27 + ext in Section 3. 
Structural rules 
Str l  F F N, if N e F 
FFN 
Str 2 FU{P}~-N 
FFN, FU{N}FP  
Sir 3 
FFP 
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Combinators 
K FKMN = M (i.e. OF KMN = M) 
S FSMNQ = MQ(NQ) 
Equality 
r FM = M 
Sb 
FFM=N,  FFP=Q 
F k MP = NQ 
FFM=N,  FFM 
FFN 
"-1= F~[M = N], 





FF Mo, rF  MI 
FV Mo^ M~ 
F F Mo ^  M1 rF  Mo ^  M, 
FF Mo FF M~ 
F k -1Mo F k "aM1 
r F-~[Mo ^ Md r F-~[Mo ^ gd  
rF-,[Mo ^  M,] ru {-~Mo} F N, Fo{-~M1} k N 
FFN 
F k M F km(~M) 
-1-11 -NE  




vVd is  
.L 
FFMN for all N e ~ 
FFVM 
F F VM 
FF MN 
F k ~(MN) 
F b m(VM) 
F F-a(VM), FU  {-a(Me)) k N all P e ~ 
F k V~x [Mx v N] 
r~ (VM v N) 
FF M, FF ~M 
FFN 
FFN 
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Ari thmetic  
~1 F~O 
FFNM 
r F N(aM) 
FFMO,  
a t3  
F b ~N,  F U (MP,  [~P} F M(oP)  all P e 
FFMN 
-a~ -a~P, if P is not a natural number of 97. 
(DN is derivable.) 
MP = NP  
Exl all P ~ 97. 
M=N 
The following facts are obvious. (1) If 27* proves F F N, and if every element 
of F holds in 97 (i.e. belongs to the set 3- defined on 4.1), so does N. 
(2) ,~ is a subsystem of 27* in the following sense: Suppose there exists a 
proof of A(x l , . . . ,  xn) on the hypotheses Bl(Xl,  • • •, xn) , . . . ,  Bk(Xl, •. •, xn), 
and let M~, . . . ,  M~ be formulas of X*; then Z* proves 
Ba(M1, . . . , M , ) ,  . . . , Bk(M1, . . . , 34,) F A (MI  , . . ., Mn). The relation (M} F N 
is representable in 97 by Theorem 5.12 (it is evidently inductive over 97); we let 
impo represent i and we define 
Io - {x [ (3y)(:~z)[x = (y,  z) A impo yz]) .  
The relation "M,-aN ~ 97" is again representable in 97; let nonimpo represent i
and define 
Jo =- {x lOy) (3z ) (x .= (y, z) h nonimpo yz}. 
The sets represented by Io ahd Jo are disjoint; for if (M,  N)  belonged to both, 
then M ~ 3-, N ~ 3- and -aN e 3- contradicting the non-triviality of 97. Hence if we 
define 
3-o =- Zxy( (x, y) .ZZoJo) 
where &e is as in 7.5, we have the 
8.1. Theorem:  [M ~o N]/s true (i.e., belongs to 97) iff Z*  proves (M)  F N;  and it 
is false (i. e., -a[M ~o iV] belongs to 3-) iff both M and -aN belong to 3-. 
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provided that in the derivation of N from M, none of the rules =oI, ~oE, "a~oI, 






~[M =o N] m[M =o N] 
7~oE and 
M ~N 
8.2. Theorem. Let 27o be 27 + ext + the four D o rules. Suppose there exists in 270 a 
proof of  A(x l ,  . . . ,  xn) on the hypotheses Bl(Xl, . . .  , x,), . . . , Bk(Xl, . . . , x,) 
and let M1, . . . ,Mn  be formulas of E*. I f  B I (M1, . . . ,M , ) , . . . ,  
Bk(M1, . . . , M,,) e 3-, so does A(M1, . . . , Mn). 
Proof. This is a straightforward proof by induction on the length of the proof in 
27o; the inductive step divides into 29 cases according to what rule or axiom on 270 
yields A(x1,  . . . , Xn). We shall consider only the 4 cases in which it is obtained by 
an 3-0 rule. 
Case 26: A(x l , . . . ,  x,,) is obtained by ~oI. Let M1, . . . ,  Mn be formulas of 
27" and suppose BI (M1, . . . ,  M , , ) , . . . ,  Bk (M1, . . . ,  M,,) e 3-. A (x i, • • •, x~) has 
the form N(x)  Do P(x), where there exists a proof in 27 of P(x) on the hypotheses 
N(x), Bl(x), Bl(X) , . . . ,  Bk(X). Since each Bi(M) is in 3-, 27* proves Bi(M) 
for l~<i~<k. By observation (2) preceding 8.1, 27" also proves 
N(M),  BI (M) , . . . ,  Bk(M) b P(M). By Sir 3 (cut rule) 27* proves N(M) l- P(M). 
By 8.1, N(M)  = o P(M), i.e., A(M)  e 3-. 
Case 27: A(x1 , . . . ,  Xn) is obtained by ~0E. Let M1, . . . ,  Mn be formulas of 
27" and suppose each Bi(M)e 3-. Suppose A(x) is obtained from C(x) and 
C(x) boA(x)  by ~oE. By the inductive hypothesis, C(M) and [C(M) boA(M)] e 
3-. By 8.1, 27* proves C(M) I-A(M). By observation (1) preceding 8.1, A(M)  e 3-. 
Case 28: A(x1 , . . . ,  Xn) is obtained by "n~al. Let M: , . . . ,  Mn be such that 
each Bi (M)e 3-. A(x)  has the form ~[N(x)=oP(x)], where there exist shorter 
proofs in 27o of N(x) and of-nP(x) on the hypotheses Bl (x ) , . . . ,  Bk(X). By the 
inductive hypothesis N(M) and ~P(M)  are in 3-. By 8.1 so is -n[N(M) Do P(M)], 
i.e., A(M).  
Case 29: A(x)  is obtained by ~oE.  Let M1, . . . ,  M~ be such that each 
Bi(M) e 3-. Suppose the first form of -amoE was used; the proof for the second 
form is exactly parallel. A(x) was obtained from [A(x) Do C(x)] by ~oE,  where 
by the inductive hypothesis ~[A(M) Do B(M)] is in 3-. By 8.1, so is A(M).  [] 
The notion I- of 27* was meant to formalize "deducibility without using any 
properties of implication". Now we extend 27" to a system 27~ which formalizes 
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the notion ko: "deducibility possibly using the four rules for ~o". The formulas of 
X~ are the same as the formulas of 27*. The assertions of 27~ have the two forms 
F k M and Fk0 M, where M is a formula and F a finite set of formulas. The rules 
of F fall into three groups as follows 
(1) Rules for k. These are the same as in 27*. 
(2) Corresponding rules for ko. These are obtained from the rules of the first 
group by writing everywhere ko for k. 





Fko P ~o N 
Fko P, Fko P ~o N 
Fko N 
FkoP, Fko~N 
Fko~(P ~o N] 
Fko~[P~oN] Fko~[P~og] 
~oE and 
Fk0 P Fko~N 
Corresponding to (1)-(2) before 8.1 we have: (1) If 27~ proves F k N or Fk0 N, 
and if every element of F belongs to 9-, so does N. The proof is by transfinite 
induction on the length of the proof of F k N or Fko N; the inductive step splits 
into subcases according to the rule used on the last step of this proof. We 
consider only the cases of the five 'new rules' listed above. 
Subcase 1: Fko N was by Lift. This is immediate, by the inductive hypothesis. 
Subcase 2: Fko N, i.e., Fk0 [A ~0 B] was obtained from F U {A} k B by =oI. 
Every element of F belongs to 9-. Let F= {C1,.. . ,  Ck}; then 27* proves kCi for 
i = 1 , . . . ,  k. Since 27~ proves F U {A} k B, Z* also proves it. This is because Z~ 
is a conservative extension of 27*; and that is because very rule of 27~ with k0 in 
the conclusion has also ko in the premisses, and is hence a rule of 27*. Since Z*  
proves F U {A} k B and since it also proves kCi for i = 1 , . . . ,  k, by the cut rule 
Sir 3 it proves A I- B. By 8.1, a ~o B is true, i.e., N is true. 
Subcase 3: FkoN is by ~oE. FkoN was obtained from FkoP and FkoP~oN. 
Every element of F is true; hence by the inductive hypothesis o are P and 
P~oN. By 8.1, 27* proves {P} kN. By observation (1) before 8.1, N is true. 
Subcase 4: Fko N is by ~o I .  Then N is-n[P~o Q] where 27~ proves Fk0 P and 
Fko-nQ by shorter proofs. Every element of F is true; hence by the inductive 
hypothesis so are P and -nQ. By 8.1, ~[P ~o Q], i.e., N belongs to 9- as well. 
Subcase 5. (~oE)  is precisely analogous. 
Corresponding to (2) before 8.1 we have (2) 270 is a subsystem of 27~ in the 
following sense: suppose there exists 27o a proof of A(x) on the hypothesis 
Bl(X),. • •, Bk(x), and let M1, . . . ,  Mn be any formulas of 2:*; then 27~ proves 
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BI (M) , . . . ,  Bk(M) 1-oA(M), and moreover, if the given of A(x)  does not use any 
D0 rules, 27~ proves {BI (M) , . . . ,  Bk(M) 1-A(M). The proof is by straightforward 
induction on the length of the proof of A(x). 
As before, the inductive relation {M} Fo N is representable by Theorem 5.12, 
so let imp1 define it and set 
I1 ~ {X [ (:ly)(:Iz)[x = (y, z ) ^ imp1 yz]). 
As before, J0 represents the set of pairs (M, N) for which M and ~N are in ~-; 
and as before we define 
~1 - Zxy ((x, y ) • ~IiJo) 
and as before Theorem 7.5 yields 
8.3. Theorem. [M ~1 N] is true iff 27~ proves {M} bo N; and it is false iff both M 
and -~N are true. 




provided that in the derivation of N from M, were of the rules ~1I, ~E ,  ~=1I, 





~[M -'~1 N] 
-a[M =1 N] -~[M =1N] 
~E and 
M ~N 
Call the resulting system 271; then by the same argument as was used in the proof 
of 8.2 we get 
8.4. Theorem. Suppose there exists in ~,1 a proof of  A(x)  on the hypothesis 
Bl(X) , . . . ,  Bk(X) and let M1, . . . , Mn be formulas of ~. I f  BI(M), . . . , Bk (n)  • 
er, so does A(M). 
This process can be repeated any finite number of times. Specifically: we define 
a sequence of non-finitary systems ZT/and finitary one X,. as follows: 
X~* has as its formulas of X*; as its assertions expressions FFj M where M is a 
formula and F a finite set of formulas, and where j ~< i; also expressions F FM 
without subscripts. The rules fall into three groups as follows 
(1) Rules for F and bo, •. •, t-/-1. These are the same as in Xi-1. 
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(2) Corresponding rules for F~. These are obtained from the rules for FI-1 by 
writing everywhere ['1 for Fi-1. 




r U {P} Fi-1 N 
=tI 
FFi P ~i N 
FFiP, FF iPDiN 
~E 
['Fi N ' 
FFi P, FFi-aN 
"l:D iI rFi-a[P N] 
FFi-a[P =, N] FFi-a[P ~i N] 
-a~ tE and 
FFi P FFi-aN 
In (3), ~i abbreviates a certain expression built up from combinators, and 
satisfying 8.9 below. 27i has as its primitive symbols the primitive symbols of 2~i_~ 
and also the symbol ~i; other formulae are built up by ( ). (Notice that Di, like 
=, -1, V . . . ,  is a primitive symbol of Z'i but a defined symbol of 27".) As its rules 




provided that in the derivation of N from M, none of the rules ~ I ,  ~E ,  -a=~I, 





"lDil -a[M ~i  N] 
-'l[M =Di N] "I[M ::3/N] 
~iE  and 
M -aN 
The relations between these systems are given by the following theorems: 
8.5. Theorem. I f  X* proves F k N or FFj N for some j with 0 <~ i <-j, and if every 
element of F is true, so is N. 
8.6. Corollary. ~'j* is consistent, i.e., for no N does ~,* prove both FiN and 
Fj-aN (j <<- i) or both FN and F-aN. 
8.7. Theorem. ,~i is a subsystem of Zi* in the following sense. Suppose there exists 
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in 27i a proof 17 of A(x) on the hypotheses Bl(X),... , Bk(x), and let M1, . . . , Mn 
be any formulas of 2:*; then ~* proves {BI(M),...  , Bk(M)} FiA(M). Moreover, 
if I I  does not use any ~ rules, 27* proves {BI(M),...  , B/,(M)} ~-A(M); and if 17 
uses only the rules ~oI , . . .  ,~0E, . . . ,  ~ f l , . . .  ,~=j: l ,  then 277" proves 
{BI(M),.. •, B,(M)} I-jA(M). 
8.8. Corollary. ~ is consistent. 
8.9. Theorem. [M ~i N] is true iff "~'~--1 proves {M} I-i-1 N, and it is false iff M is 
true and N is false. 
8.10. Theorem. Suppose there exists in 277 a proof of A(X) on the hypotheses 
B~(x),..., Bk(x), and let M1, . . . ,  M, be formulas of ~*. I f  Ba(M) , . . . ,  
Bk(M) e J-, so does A(M). 
We do not give proofs of these theorems ince they parallel exactly the proofs 
of 8.1-8.4. 
We now assemble all the 27i into one large system Z=. The primitive symbols of 
Z/ are the primitive symbols of X together with Do, DI, D2, . . .  ; ~,  for every 
non-negative integer n. The formulas of Xi are built up from the primitive 
symbols by ( ). The axioms and rules of 27= are the axioms and rules of 2" + ext 
together with the following four: 
(M) 
~il  N 
MDiN 
provided that in the derivation of N from M no use is made of any of the rules 





-'1 =:3 i l  
-~[M ~i N] 
m[M =i N] m[M =i N] 
"n~E and 
M mN 
Since every proof 17 in Z'® is also a proof in ~,  where i is the highest subscript 
occurring on an implication sign in H, we have at once from 8.8: 
8.11. Theorem. 27® is consistent. 
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9. Postscript on analysis 
The motivation for 'levels of implication' is the following: We would like to 
develop in our system a significant amount of analysis. On the face of it, there are 
(at least) two ways of doing this, according as we interpret he reals as cauchy 
sequences or Dedekind cuts. The former method leads to a 'constructive' theory 
similar to the recursive analysis of the Russian school: it has kinships with 
Bishop's analysis too, as will be seen shortly. This theory based on Cauchy reals 
does not require any 'levels of implication' since it lies in a region of X ruled by 
classical predicate calculus (so that ---> of Section 3 is a usable implication). By 
contrast, the interpretation of reals as Dedekind cuts gives something much closer 
to classical analysis: in fact something essentially equivalent o Fitch's "Demon- 
strably Consistent Mathematics" [8]. The trouble is, that for Fitch even the most 
trivial parts of analysis (e.g. the proposition that the reals are closed under 
addition) have to be stated in the metalanguage (in this case, as "If 'M is a 
(Dedekind) real' and 'N is a real' are theorems, so is 'M + N is a real'"). The 
statement '(Vxy)(x is a real and y is a real --->x +y is a real)' turns out to be 
neither true nor false. However by using Do, ~1 and D 2 we can state (and prove 
in 27~) not only the mentioned result but most of the contents of an average 
textbook on elementary real analysis: in particular the Heine-Borel theorem and 
Peano's theorem on differential equations, neither of which, as we shall soon see, 
is provable for the Cauchy reals. 
First we look at the Cauchy approach, then the Dedekind one. For the former, 
we first isolate a fragment of 27 + ext which satisfies classical ogic. Observe first 
that every recursive relation between natural numbers is completely represented: 
this is because all recursive functions are definable and because of Rule D=.  
Further we have the derived rules 
DM DM, DN DM, DN DM, DN 
D(-aM]' D[M ^  N]' D[M v N]' D[M---> N]' 
D(Mx) D(Mx) 
D(('Cx)Mx)' D((3x)Mx)" 
with the obvious restrictions on x in the last two. Putting all this together (and not 
forgetting Rule DN) we get: 
9.1. Theorem. Every formula built up from recursive conditions on natural 
numbers by propositional connectives and quantifiers restricted to natural numbers 
is (provably in X) definite. 
Now consider ationals. For m, n, 1 • • we code the rational (m - n)/(l + 1) by 
(m, n, l). Define Q, <o, Go, >o,  I>o, =o in the obvious way. The notion of a 
recursive function of rationals is clear: they must satisfy a =o b----~fa =~fb etc. 
The recursive functions +o, -o ,  [ [o, xo, +o are easy to define. 
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Now for the reals. A-->B means {f l (Vx) (xeA- - . fxeB)} ,  ~+ means 
{neN In4:0} and 
Re=-- {f Q [ (Vst  +)[Ifs -ftl 1/s + l /t]} 
where in the interest of legibility we have left off various subscripts. 
The subscript c means 'Cauchy'; until we move to Dedekind reals we'll leave 
that off too. 
By a type we mean any element of the least set containing [~, Q and R and 
containing At---~A2 and A1 x • • • x An whenever it contains A1, • • •, An. Here 
A l×- - '×An -={x[ (3y l , . . . , yn)  [x=(y l , . . . , y , )  
^ Yl eA1 ^ "  "" ^ Y,, cAn]}. 
9.2. Lemma. 1~, Q and R are definite. 
9.3. Lemma. I f  A1, • . . ,  An are definite so are AI-+ A2 and A1 × • • • × An. 
9.4. Lemma. Every type is definite. 
9.5. Theorem. Every formula built up by connectives and quantifiers from 
definite formulas (in particular from formulas of the form M = N and formulas 
expressing recursive conditions on natural numbers or rationals) is definite. 
9.6. Definit ion. a=n b =--(Vs ~ N+)[l(as) - (bs)l ~2/s ]  
9.7. Lemma. D [a =a b]. 
Here and henceforth, when a formula of 27 is stated as a theorem or lemma, it 
means 'provably in 27 + ext'. 
9.8. Definit ions. a +.  b, a -a  b, a x .  b, a ÷.  b, lain are defined as in Aberth [1, 
pp. 22-23] or Bishop [5, pp. 16, 21]. 5 
9.9. Theorem. a I "a  a2, bl =a b2 ---~ al + ba =a a2 + b2 
^ al - ba =a a2 -- bE 
A a I X b2 - 'a  a2 x b E. 
al =a  a2, bl =a b2 4: (Lr)Do--~ al + b =a a2 + b2. 
9.10. Theorem. Provably in 27: The reals are a field. 
5 There is a minor  technical difficulty with division by zero on which we do not wish to linger. If  we 
are careful, we can define a+ n so that ff a eR ,  then a+R0 n, though well-defined, is not a real 
~umber. ~.~ 
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(By 9.5 and 9.7 we can apply classical logic to the field axioms.) 
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9.11. Definition. a <R b =- (3st ~ [~+)[a(s) + 1/s < b(t) + 1/t] ^  a, b e R. 
Likewise a <~R b, a >R b, a >~R b. 
9,12. Theorem. (a) D[a<Rb] ,  D[a<~Rb], D[a>Rb],  D[a~ab] .  
(b) a, be~,--->[a=Rb]v[a<Rb]v[a>ab]. 
(Thus our theory resembles recursive analysis (as a subanalysis of classical 
analysis) more than Bishop-style analysis.) 
A real function is a map f :  R---> R for which (Vxy ~ R)[x=Ry--->fx=afy]; the 
set ,~(R, R) of real functions is definite by 9.3 and 9.7. It is easy to extend this to 
functions of more than one variable and to show that polynomials with real 
coefficients are real functions. Also we can define what it is to be a function on an 
interval, or on the whole real line except for a finite number of points, and prove 
that rational functions have the latter property. 
To progress further, we need to define 'limit'; and this needs care. 
We can define 'x is the limit of the sequence {a,}' or 'a,--->x' as 
(:If e ~(R  +, R))(Ve e R+)(Vm e N+)[(mR >f(e)]---> [la(m) - x I <e]] 
(where R += {x e R Ix CR 0) and ms is the real corresponding to the integer m; 
cf. Aberth [1, p. 39]). 
However, it seems almost certain that we cannot define 'lim' itself: i.e., we 
doubt very much that there is a term 'lim' for which 2" ( + ext) proves 
('Ca : [~+ ----> R)(Vx e R )[[an ---> x]---> [x =R l ima] ] .  6 
Likewise, we can define 'k is the limit offx as x--->a' or 'f-X--'>x_,al' as 
(:ibc ~ R)[b < a < c A f: (b, z) U (a, c)---> R 
^ (3d e ~(R +, R)(Ve • R+)(Vx ~ (b, a) U (a, c)) 
[ix - al < d(e)~ If(x) - II < el] 
(where (b,a)=- {x ER Ib<x <a}; cf. Aberth [1, p. 61]). 
However, it seems almost certain that we cannot define this kind of 'tim' either; 
i.e., we doubt very much that there is a term 'tim' for which 2" ( + ext) proves 
(Vbac e It~)(Vf: (b, a) U (a, c)----> •)(V/e R)[fx ~ l---> lim(f, z) =a l]+. 
6 Not do we bel ieve that corresponding 'lims' are definable in the usual systems of constructive set 
theory. 
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Again, we can define 'fis the derivative of g • ~(e, a, h), R)' as 
f e ~(a, b), ~)  ^  (3d • ~(R + x (a, b), R))(Vxoxlx2 • (a, b))(Ve • ~+) 
[ g(x l ) -g(x2) l - f (xo)<e]  xl  4:x2 ^  Ix1 - x01, Ix2 -  xol d(e, Xo)  X2 
(cf. Aberth [1, pp. 76-77], Bishop [5, p. 40]). 
However, it seems almost certain that we cannot define differentiation itself; 
i.e., we doubt very much that there is a term 'D' for which provably 
(Vab•~)(Vfg)[a<b ^f,g:(a,b)- - ->~^f the derivative of g on (a,b)--->f= 
Dg]. 7 
Finally we can define 'f is the value of the definite (Riemann) integral of g on 
[a,b]' as 
(:ld • ~(R +, [~))(Vn ~ [~+)(Vx: O. . .  n--* [~)(Vy: 1 - - .  n--~ ~) 
(Ve •R+)((n,x, y) a grid of [a, b] ^  Ilxll <-d(p)---> 
y(qD,)(x,- xi_ ) - e 
(where (n ,x ,y)  is called a grid of [a, b] if xo-a,  xn=b, and (Vm<n)(Xm~ 
y,~+~ Xm+O, and where Ilxll-max,,,<,, (x,,,+l- x,,,); cf. Aberth [1, p. 941, Bishop 
[5, pp. 46-47]). 
However, it seems almost certain that we cannot define integration itself; i.e. 
we doubt very much that there is a term "I" for which provably 
(Vabfg)[a, b, f • ~ ^  g is the integral of f on [a, b ]---> g = l (f, a, b ) ]7 
With the above definitions we can parallel most of the positive development of
Aberth's book (and, in view of Theorems 9.5, 9.7 and 9.11, we get much more 
than the positive development of the corresponding part of Bishop's book, since 
our logic is classical not intuitionistic). By positive we mean that part which holds 
in classical analysis. 
Specifically we get from Aberth's Chapter 5: Every Cauchy sequence of reals 
converges; every Cauchy sequence of real functions converges; every uniform 
Cauchy sequence of real functions converges uniformly, where we refer the 
reader to Aberth loc. cit. for the definitions. 
Things get more interesting when we try to mimic Chapter 7 of Aberth's book 
(continuous functions). 
9.13. Definition. Let I be an interval ((a, b), [a, b l, ( -~, 0], R etc.) and let 
7 Again (cf. previous footnote)we doubt equally that differentiation and integration i  this sense (as 
functionals from suitable subsets of R--~ R into R--> R) are definable in the usual intuitionistic 
systems. This will not affect Bishop's use of them, since his differentiable and integrable functions are 
more complicated objects with the required moduli 'built in'; but it will affect Bridge's use thereof. 
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f:  I---> R. Then 
f continuous on I=-(:ld ~ ~(1~ + x I, R))(Ve ~ R+)(VXXo~I) 
[Ix - x01 d(e, Xo)  I f (x )  - f (xo)[  < e], 
f uniform continuous on I - (:ld ~ ,~(R + ---> • ÷))(Ve e ~ ÷)(Vxxo ~ I) 
[Ix - xol < d(p)---> If(x) -f(xo)l  < e]. 
The most interesting positive result of Aberth's Chapter 7 is the intermediate 
value theorem, which we now prove on the lines of his 7.5 [1, p. 63]. 
9.14. Theorem. fe~( [a ,b ] ,R )  continuous on [a,b], f (a )<a,  f(b)>0---> 
(3c)[a < c < b ^ f(c) =~ 0]. 
Proof. Suppose not. (This we can do because by 9.7 and 9.11 a <c<b and 
f(c)R = 0 are each definite, whence by 9.5 so is (3c)[a <c < b ^f (c )=R0] .  And 
evidently DA and -~A---> A yield A in ~.) Then for every x e [a, b], either f (x)  < 0 
or f (x )> 0 and in fact (see Lemma 9.15 below) there is a function g = [a, b]---> 
{-1, 1} such that for all x e[a,b],  either g(x) =-1  and f(x) <0,  or g(x)= +1 
and f (x )  >0. Define then sequences {ai}, {bi} as follows: 
ao = a, b0 = b, 
2 >0, 
an+x= l (  bn) 
a~+b~), "2 if f(a~ + ~ <0, 
bn+ 1 = 
(a~ + if f (  a~ + >0, 
bn, i f f (  an 2 +b~) <0" 
Using the function g, we can make this recursive definition by cases into a direct 
definition. {ai} and {bi} are evidently Cauchy and converge (by [1, Ch. 5]) to 
numbers cl and c2 respectively. Since lag - bil = (b - a)/2i---> O, Cl =R c2. 
We claim f(cO = 0. If not, either f (c l )< 0 while for bi's arbitrarily close to c2 
(hence also to ca) we have f (b i )> 0, contradicting continuity; or else f (c l )> 0 
while for a~'s arbitrarily close to cl we have f(a~)<0, again contradicting 
continuity. By the remark at the beginning of the proof, we are done except for 
the lemma. 
9.15. Lemma. (a) There is a term tz such that for every f: [~---> [~ such that if 
fx = 0 for some x ~ [~, l~f is the least such x. (Consequently, every recursive 
function is definable in ,~.) 
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(b) There is a term sg such that for every a ~ ff~, ira >0,  then sg(a) = 1 while if 
a < 0 then sg(a) = -1.  
Proof. Ad (a). Find by the fixed point theroem a term v such that for every f and 
X 
~fx= (K(vf(ox)))Yxx. 
Then iffx = O, ~ = x, while iffx is a natural number >0, vfx = vf(ox). So (a) is 
true with/z = (~.f)vf0; e.g. if f(0), f(1), f(2) > 0 but f(3) = 0 we have 
W 
l~ f=vfO=vf l=vf2=ar f3=3.  
Ad (b). If a e R, then a <0 iff a( t )<- (1 /0  for some t e ~, while a >0 iff 
a > ( l / t )  for some t e N. By (a) we define s such that s(a) is the least n (if such 
exists) for which either s(n)> 1/n or s(n) < -1/n;  from such an s it is routine to 
define sg. 
We shall see shortly that there is no hope of proving in 27 + ext 
(:iO)(Vf e ~;(R, R ))(Vxy e R)[(x <y  A fx <0 Afy > O---> f (  ff~fxy) = O] 
SO that in a suitable sense 9.14 is not 'effective'. Likewise, if we parallel the 
developments of Aberth's Chapter 8 (differentiation) in 27 ( + ext) we get 
9.16. Theorem. a, b e R ^ a < b ^f ,  g e ~([a, b], ~) ^  g derivative o f f  
^ fa=Rfb--->(:lc)[a <c <b  ^  gc =R 0]. 
But there is no • with a < ¢I~fgab < b and g(tI~fgab) = 0. Also (Rollers theorem): 
9.17. Theorem. a, b ~ R ^ a < b ^f ,  g ~ o~([a, b], ~) ^  g derivative o f f  
---> (3c)[a <c  <b ^ gc=[fb -fa]/[b -a ] ] .  
But there is no W with a< tI~fgab<b and g(tPfgab)=[fb- fa] / [b-a]  (mean 
value theorem): 
Again, if we parallel the developments of Aberth's Chapter 10 (integration) in 
27 ( + ext) we get: 
9.18. Theorem. V~ proves: A uniform continuous function on [a, b] is (Riemann) 
integrable ooer [a, b ]. 
But the usefulness of this result is slightly marred by the fact that we cannot 
prove that every continuous function on [a, b] is Riemann integrable; afortiori  
we cannot prove that they are all uniform continuous. (All these troubles vanish 
when we use Dedekind rea ls - - see  9.30 below.) 
It is time to construct he model which gives the above independence r sults: 
after doing that, we shall list a few more. 
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Consider a combinatory structure (M,-) where M is the closure under • of 
{K, S, E, A1, A2 , . . .  }. Equality is defined by the usual 
Kx = x, Sxyz = xz(yz) 
together with the requirement that = is a substitutive quivalence relation, the 
extensionality rule 
ab = cb 
(all b e M) (*)  
a- -c  
and all equations of the form Era 1 = a, where a is any term and where ral is its 
'G6del-number'. So as to make every number a 'G/Sdel-number', we set rK1 = 0, 
[$1 = 1, rE] = 2, rAil = 2 i+1 and r(MN)] = (2rM ] + 3) • 2 rN1. Thus E is an enum- 
eration of M; the first few elements of this enumeration are E0= K, E1 = S, 
E2 = E,  E3 = KK ,  E4  = A1, E5  = SK,  E6  = KS,  E7  = EK ,  E8 = A2, E9  = KKK,  
El0 = SS, . . . .  
The enumeration E plays no role in the current independence proofs: however 
we put it in because we shall need it later (in Section 10) for some other 
consistency proofs. 
We let 3~ be the Frege structure canonically extending this combinatory 
structure. It is clear that all the axioms of 27 + ext (even of 27=) hold in 4 ;  for 
they hold in all Frege structures. We claim also that Church's thesis 
(¥f: N~ N)(=le e N)(Vx e N)(fx = {e}x) 
holds in :~; hence so do all of its consequences, including the nonexistence of the 
functionals ~, ~ just mentioned, the existence of non-Riemann integrable 
continuous functions etc., which are hence consistent with 27 + ext (or 27=). We 
proceed to the details. For rigor the above formula should be written 
(Vf: N-* N)(:le e N)(Vx e N)(:ly • N) 
T(e, x, y)=0 ^  (Vz <y)T(/, x, z) 0 ^  f (x )= U(y) 
where T and U are Kleene's well-known functions. Now this formula is true in 3~. 
For if f: N--->N and m • N, then f (m)  is the unique for which ' f (m)= n' is 
provably by the identity rules: but the identity rule (*)  can, as we observed 
before, be replaced with no loss of strength by 
aA i = b A i 
a=b 
where A i is some indeterminate not occurring, in a or b; hence the set of all 
(m, n) for which 'f(m)= n' is recursively enumerable; hence f is recursive. 
Hence 
9.19. Theorem. Church's thesis is consistent with 27 (or 27 + ext, or X®). Hence so 
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are the following. (References refer to theorems in Aberth's book which can be 
routinely deduced from Church's thesis.) 
(a) There is a strictly monotone increasing bounded sequence of reals that does 
not converge to a limit. (5.4, p. 41) 
(b) Every real function is continuous. (7.2, p. 173) 
(c) There is a real function defined on a compact interval but not uniform 
continuous thereon. (7.3, p. 59) 
(d) There is a real function defined on a compact interval but no bounded 
thereon. (7.9, p. 68) 
(e) There is a real function defined on a compact interval and bounded thereon, 
but which has no sup. (7.10, p. 68) 
(f) There is a real function defined on a compact interval and having a sup but 
which never attains its sup. (7.12, p. 70) 
(g) There is a real function defined on a compact interval and bounded thereon, 
but no integrable thereon. (10.9, p. 108) 
(h) There is a real function defined on a compact interval which is not integrable 
thereon, but none the less possesses an antiderivative (10.10, p. 110) 
(i) There is a continuous real function f(x, y) defined on the closed square 
Ixl<-l, [yl~<l and bounded thereon, such that for no 0<b<l  and no 
y•~([ -b ,  +b] ,R)  do we have y(0)=0, y '=f (x ,y ) .  (12.2, p. 123; coun- 
terexample to Peano's theorem). 
(j) Heine-Borel theorem is false. (13.2, p. 131) 
This completes our (admittedly sketchy) outline of analysis as based on Cauchy 
sequences. Analysis based on Dedekind cuts is quite different: in particular none 
of the counterexamples 9.19(a)-(j) exists. We proceed to the details. 
9.20. Definition. ~O = {X I Dlx ^  x c Q A (3y)[y • X] ^ (3y • •)[y q X] 
^ (Vzw)[z  •x  ^ w~z~w •x]  
^ (Vz)[z • x--,  (3w >~ Z)[w ~ x]]}. 
Let us first see why the ordinary truth-functional implication ---> will not work 
for Dedekind reals. Let ?-= {x lx  <o0~ A F}, where Fis a formula (e.g. R e R, R 
the Russel set) such that both F and ~F lead to a contradiction. 
If F ? • RD then 
(i) F(3y)[y • ?] whence FF, 




F-~(DI?) (D~ -=  {x [ (Vy)[y ex v ~[y • x]l}, or  
F-~[? = Q], whence F(3x)[x • ?] and FF, or 
F(Vy • Q)[y ~ ?], whence F~[ - I~•  ?] and F~F, or  
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(v) F(3zw)[z • ? ^ w <<-o Z ^ w ~ ?], whence t-F, or finally 
(vi) ~-(:lz)[z • ? ^ -a(:iw >~ Z)[w • ?]], whence one more ~-F. 
Each of the conclusions (F in cases (i), (iii), (v) and (vi), ~F  in case (iv) and 
-a(Dl?) in case (ii)) leads to a contradiction whence so do ? e ~ and ? ¢ R. The 
same is easily seen to be true of [ ?+a0R]eR and [?+ROR]¢R, 8 and 
consequently also of (Vx)[x • ~---> Ix +R OR • ~]). It is this that forces us to use 
non-truth functional implications even for the very beginnings of real numbers. 
Let us now therefore develop the theory of (Dedekind) real numbers and a bit 
of elementary analysis using our hierarchy of implications. Here and henceforth 
we'll drop the subscript D and any other subscripts which can be easily supplied. 
9.21. Definition. (a) x =R Y --= x, y • ~ A (VZ)[Z e X ~ Z • y], 
means [g---> N] ^ [N <-- M]. 
(b) x<<-Rym(Vz)[z ex--->z •y]  (i.e. z•x  v z •y).  
(c) x <,  y -- [Ix "<R Y] A ~[X =R Y]]- 
Likewise :/:, ~>, >. 
where M <--> N
9.22. Definit ion. x +R Y, x -R  Y, -R  x, Ix[a, x x R Y, x/R Y are defined as usual. 
Henceforth we drop the subscript R if this can be done without ambiguity. 
9.23. Definition. (a) a Num b - a • N v 
(3f: {z •~:z  < a}'----> b)(Vx)[x • b----> (::lz < a)[x = fz]]}. 
(b) Fin -= {x I (3a)[a Numb]}, Fin is the class of (definite) finite sets. 
9.24. Theorem. X= proves: Dla ~o D(Fin a). 
This enables us to prove (in precisely the classical way) the following version of 
Kfnig's  Lemma: [R is an infinite tree, i.e., an infinite connected acyclic graph 
each vertex of which has finite order] ~0 [R contains an infinite path]. 
9.25. Definition. Cauchy ~ {f: [~+-->R [(Ve e•)[e > 0--+ (3n • [~)(V]k > n) 
[[(f]) - f (k ) [  < e~]]} 
where eR---{x •Q Ix <oe} and where of course R is •D. 
9.26. Definit ion. ai---~b =- (Vi)[ai • R] A b • ~ ^ ( re  • Q) 
[e> 0--> (3n • N)(Vj > n)[la  - bl < e.]. 
s The definition of +R is gigan immediately below. 
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There is no trouble with 'lim' as there was in the theory based on Cauchy reals 
(see above, just after cf. 12); for if we define 
9.27. Definition. lim a - {y I Inf{x l y • x ^ (3n) [x  =.  an]} }. 
we can prove without difficulty 
9.28. Theorem. 27® proves: a: N +---> R =1 [a • Cauchy =-o(:lb)[ai---> b] =--o[ai---> 
lima]] (where F=-i A means [F=iA] A [A =iF]). 
Nor is there any essential difficulty with the other lim (of a function as its 
argument approaches a certain value), though there is an annoyance. Set 
~)(R ,  R ) -  ( f l  (Vxy)[x, y • R ^ x =R y =n fX • R ^fx =. fy]} 
and 
fx ~ b - f  • ~(n)(n, n )  ^ ('¢e • Q)Ie > 0---> (:ld • Q)[d > 0 
^ (Vx)[x • R ^ la - xl < d.] =n [Ifa -#1 < e~lll]}. 
The superscripts are surely a nuisance, and it would be nice if we could replace 
them by say (1) in all interesting cases: more work needs to be done here. But 
they are not too bad, because iffx (")> b then fx (k)~ b for all k > n. The other lim 
is also relative to a level of implication 
{z , ^ z ,u]}; 
x- - -~a  
we might get more limits as n increases, but they would not change their values 
once they started to exist. More precisely: if lim(n)f(x) is non-empty, then 
lim(k)f(x) =n lim(n)f(x) for all k > n. 
For the derivative and (Riemann)integral  we happily do not need any 
subscripted implication signs: we can write 
9.29. Definition. (a) f '  --- (Zx) lim ai(x), where 
ai(x)--½i[f[x+~]--f[x--~]].  
(b) f~f(x) dx =- lim di, where 
1 i-1 F 
d,-- ;, oILO ÷ 
(We leave it to the reader to extend (a) and the defin fion of 3~(R, R) to the 
case of functions not necessarily defined on the whole real line, but only on an 
interval; also to give a formal definition of (b) in 27.) 
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Thus differentiation, integration and limits of sequences are straightforward 
'functions' in ~®, and limilts of functions are only notationally annoying. Likewise 
the definition of various real functions by power series can be taken over bodily 
from the classical treatment if we use Dedekind cuts: 
i 
~ cixi~-linl E CjX j, 
i=O i"~ j=O 
/ ( -1 )  ~ ~ 
coSX ~---(~)i=O ~)Xo 
This simple treatment is unavailable in the treatment with Cauchy sequences, as 
the reader will quickly learn if he tries say to define cos. 
Roughly speaking, the theory based on Rc lives in 'peaceful coexistence' with 
that based on R o, as a 'constructive' theory (but with classical ogic, see the 
beginning of this section) by the side of a more or less 'classical' one. How 
classical the theory of R o is may be seen from the following theorem, which 
should be compared with 9.19 above. 
9.30. Theorem. ~'® proves 
(a) [a eRt~^f:N--->RD^ (Vx ~N)[[fx<af(x +1)] ^ f'x <e a]] 
~o~i--> {x l (an e N)x el(n)}]. 
("Every bounded monotone sequence converges", contrast 9.19(a).) 
(b) (=If • ~'<°)(R, R))(Vx)[[RatxDo[f'x=a 1]]^ [Irratx ~o[fX =a 0]]]. 
Here "Rat x" abbreviates "(=lz • Q)[x =R ze]" and "Irrat x" abbreviates "[x • 
R ] A -~(Rat x)". 
(c) (Vf)[f • Cont(n)([0, 1], R) Dn+l (Ve • Q)[e > 0-1-> (=ld e O) 
[d>0 A (Vxy)[x, y•[0, 1] A Ix-yl<de =,+1 [[fx -fYl < ee]]]]. 
("Every continuous function on [0,1] is uniform continuous.") Here 
"Contfn)([0, 1], R ]" abbreviates 
{f • a~")([0, 1], R I (Vxe)[[x • [0, 1] ^  e • Q ^ e > 0] 
=,, (~d • Q)[d >0  ^  (Vy)[[y •[0, 1] ^  Ix-yl<de]=,,lfx-fyl<e.]]]}. 
(d)-(f) (Vf)[f e Cont(~)([0, 1], R)=~+2(:ix e [0, 1])('¢y) 
[y • [0, 11 =. +1 [fy ~<. fx 111. 
("Every continuous function on [0, 1] attains its sup"--this is numbered (d)-(f) 
because it rules out the three types of pathology mentioned in 9.19(d)-(f).) 
(g)-(h) (Vf)[f • Contr')((0, 1), R) D,+2 (=lg • Cont(n)([0, 1], R))('Cx) 
Ix • [0, 1] =.+lg(x)  = [~f(t) dt ^  x • (0, 1) ~,+lf-X = g 'x ] ] .  
("Every continuous function on [0, 1] has a continuous Riemann integral theorem, 
which is also its antiderivative"- rulling out the pathologies of 9.19(g)-(h).) 
(i) (Vf)[f • Cont(~)([[ - 1, + 1] x [ -  1, +III, a) =.+2 (ab ~ ~)[0 < b < 1 
^ (:ly • Cont(n+l)((-bn, +be), [-1, + 1]))[y(O) =e 0 ^  (Vx) 
[x • ( -be ,  +be)=,+ly ' (x )=e l (x ,  Y)]]l. (Peano's theorem) 
82 R.C. Flagg, J. Myhill 
(j) [Dla A (VX)[X • a---> Dxx] A (Vn)[x • [0, 1] =, (=Iv • a)[x • vll] 
=,,+2 (:iw)[Fin w A Dlw A ('¢X)[X eW--->X ca]  A (YU)(U e[0, 1] 
=n+2 (:IV • W)[U • V]]]. (Heine-Borel) 
Hints for proofs. (a) is trivial; for (b) take f-=- (Zx)(y I Y <a 0 V [y <a 1Q A 
Ratx]}; for (c) see Fitch [9]; proofs (d)-(i) parallel the classical ones closely, 
using the result of (j) wherever necessary (the proof of Peano's theorem in Murray 
and Miller [12, pp. 1-13] is completely elementary and can be translated quite 
routinely); (j) is the principal result of Fitch [9]. 
What theorems of 'classical analysis' do not go over in Z~? There seems to be 
no trouble with the Brouwer fixed point theorem (we haven't verified the details 
yet though, except in the trivial one-dimensional case) and the Banach fixed-point 
theorem is routine: this together with 9.30(i) should get ordinary differential 
equations off to a flying start. (Functional analysis may well be another story!) 
One theorem of 'classical' analysis (?) that does not go through (following up a 
well-known observation of Kreisel) is 
Cantor-Bendixson Theorem. Every closed set (say on the line) is the union of a 
perfect set and a scattered one. 
Kreisel noticed that this perfect set is not necessarily hyperarithmetic even 
when the closed set has a very simple logical definition: this observation can 
straightforwardly be made into a proof that we cannot prove in 2'~ that a definite 
closed set is the union of a (definite) nowhere dense and definite perfect subset. 
This is on the fringe of classical analysis, though. 9
Verification of 9.30 was somewhat painful, and for further investigations we are 
in need of powerful metatheorems relating ~ to well-known systems. Simpson's 
proof of the equivalence of Peano's theorem and K6nig's lemma led us to 
conjecture 9.30(i), but couldn't be used to give a proof of it since our logic is not 
classical enough (despite 9.24). For the same reasons, there seems no direct way 
of applying here Aczel's proof-theoretic results in [2]. 
10. Some extensions 
A. To any of our systems we may consistently add Church's thesis 
(vf: N)(:ie •  )(Vx • N)(:iy • 
[T(e, x, y) =0 A (VZ < y)[T(e, x, z) 4=0] A [f(x) = U(y)]] 
because it holds in the model introduced just after 9.18. If we do this, then all the 
statements asserted to be consistent in Theorem 9.19 become theorems. 
9 Classically, if A is the closed set in question, its 'perfect kernel' can be defined (see Sion [18]) as 
the set of all x ~ A each of whose neighborhoods contains uncountably many elements of A; and the set 
so definition be routinely shown in Z,,, to be definite i rA  is. The reader who wishes to sharpen his 
intuition of Z~ should reflect on why this does not contradict the assertion in the text. 
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B. Axiom of choice. The axiom 
(Vx)(::ln e ~)[x = En] 
is consistent in virtue of the same model. Here E is a new primitive: in terms of it 
we define 
x < y --=(3n e [~)[[E,, = x] A (Vm <n)[Em Cy]]  
and prove easily that < is a strict simple ordering. It is a well-ordering in the 
sense that 
r 
Dla ^  (3x)[x ea]=o(::lx)[x ea  ^ (Vy)[y ea-.-->x<~y]] 
is a theorem (here Dxa means (Vx)[x e a v Ca]). We can also prove the 
multiplicative axiom 
Dla ^  (Vx)(x ca---> D,x ^  (3y)[y  ex]]Do=o(3U)[(Vx)[x eu 
----> (3y)[x ey  ^ y ca]]  ^  (Vx)[x ea---->(=lv)(Vw)[[w ex  ^  w eu]~-->w=v]]] 
where u is of course simply 
{x ] (3y)(y e a ^ x e y ^ (Vz)[z e y ---> x ~< z]]}. 
We have not investigated whether these axioms of choice are of any use in 
analysis. 
C. Inductive definitions. Such useful classes as the class of all von Neumann 
ordinals, the class of all constructive ordinals, the class of all Borel sets, the class 
of all iterative or well-founded sets etc. can be defined by the following schema: 
If we have deduced xRz from xRy and y c z (i.e., (Vu)(yu--> zu)) by a proof 
which is general with respect to x, y and z (i.e., if R is provably monotone) we 
may introduce Ind A by the following two rules 
M c Ind R NRM 
(a) N e Ind R 
(b) [y=M] 
[xRy] 
x e M P • Ind R 
PeM 
(In (b), the first premiss is to be general with respect o x and y. If we take M as 
{u I (3z c IndR)uRz}, we get a converse to (a).) 1° 
For example, the class of Borel sets is Induct R, where xRy iff (x is open) or (x 
1°It would be neater if instead of (a) we had N R IndR and instead of (b) we had 
[xRM] N e Ind R '  
x~M Pe IndR 
However we do not know how to justify such a rule, and at least one of us 
PeM 
doubts very much if such a justification is possible. 
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is dosed) or (for some f:N.-.->y, x is extensionally equal to [._J,,~Nf(n) or 
Nn~Nf(N). 
We will prove that a sign Ind can be introduced into any of our systems o that 
it satisfies (a) and (b) provided R is provably monotone. 
By the fixed point theorem we can find Ind so that for every R 
Ind R = {x I (3y = Ind R)xRy } 
and this clearly satisfies (a). 
For (b), we proceed by induction on the length of the proof (in the non-finitary 
system) of P e Ind R. Suppose (1) this proof has length a~ and suppose (2) that the 
first premiss of Rule (b) is probable in 27 (or whatever), so that whenever Q c M 
and TRQ are probable (in the non-finitary system), so is T e M. Suppose (3) the 
inductive hypothesis: if U e Ind R is provable by using a proof of length <tr, then 
so is U e M. Finally suppose (4) R is provably monotone, so that if Q c N and 
TRQ are provable, so is TRQ. We shall show that P e M is provable; that will 
validate (b). 
(5) For some fl < a~ and for some Y, PRY and Y c Ind R are provable by 
proofs of length fl or less. This is from (1) and the definition of Ind. 
Let H be (a symbol completely representing) the set of all u for which u e Ind R 
is provable by a proof of length <fl (el. above). We have 
(6) Y c H is provable, where Y is as in (5). For every term T, by (5), either 
T ~ Y or T e Ind R is provable; in the latter case by (5) again and the definition of 
H, T e H is provable. Hence so is (Vx)(x ¢ Y v x E H), i.e., Y c H. 
(7) PRH is provable, by (5), (6) and (4). 
(8) H c M is provable. For every term T, by the definition of H, either T ¢ H 
or T e H is provable, and in the latter case (also by the definition of H) T e Ind R 
is provable by a proof of length <fl and a fortiori <tr; hence by (3) so is T e M. 
Hence so is (Vy)(x ~ H tJ x e M), i.e., H c M. 
(9) P e M is provable, by (2), (7) and (8). 11 
A more radical way to introduce inductive definitions (suggested by Aczel [2]) 
is to use a new primitive 0 completely representing the set of notations for 
constructive ordinals. In another paper, one of us will investigate what happens to 
the Burali-Forti paradox under each of these approaches. 
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